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INTRODUCTION 
 Whereas in 2013 there had been widespread celebration of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Gideon 
v. Wainwright,1 much has been written in subsequent years about the 
unhappy state of the quality of counsel provided to indigents.2 But it is 
not just defense counsel who fail to comply with all that we hope and 
expect would be done by those who are part of our criminal courts; 
prosecutorial misconduct, if not actually increasing, is becoming more 
visible.3 The judiciary chooses to focus on the rapid processing of 
cases, often ignoring the rights of those being prosecuted – rights the 
judges have sworn to protect. 
 
 But we must ask why has this country tolerated a criminal 
justice system which has been so dysfunctional? Why are many of the 
criminal courts in our urban centers an embarrassment to any of us 
who would want to see the individualized care and concern that our 
nation prides itself in maintaining and championing? Why is funding 
for our criminal courts – the public defenders, prosecutors, and the 
judiciary – so inadequate? 
 
 This Article offers an explanation: America tolerates unjust 
and often unconstitutional treatment of those accused of crime because 
so many of those accused are minorities.  
The incarceration rate in Illinois for African-Americans has 
been reported at more than 10 times that of Whites;4 African-
American men between the ages of 18 and 65, who accounted for just 
                                                 
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Then-Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, commented a 
few  months  after  the  decision,  that  it  “changed  the  whole  course  of  American  legal  
history.” Eric H. Holder, Gideon – A Watershed Moment, 2012 THE CHAMPION 56.   
2  See, e.g., infra notes 113–121. 
3  See, e.g., the comment by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth  Circuit  that,  “there  is  an  epidemic  of  Brady  violations  abroad  in  the  land.”  
United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 625 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting). 
4  PAUL STREET, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: RACE, PRISONS, JOBS, AND COMMUNITY IN 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AND THE NATION 11 (2002). 
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4% of the total population in the state, comprised 57% of those 
incarcerated.5   
In Maryland, African-American men are incarcerated at 6.37 
times the rate that White men are.6  
In New Jersey as of 2013, African-Americans represented 15% 
of the population,7 but 61% of the state’s inmates.8  
In Texas, African-Americans have been incarcerated at 5 times 
the rate of Whites.9   
In South Carolina, African-Americans are 28% of the 
population,10 yet comprise 64% of the incarcerated.11 
In Tennessee, African-Americans are 17% of the population12 
yet make up 44%13 of all inmates.   
                                                 
5  Id. at 11–12.  Fully 80% of the adult African-American males in the workforce in 
Chicago have been convicted of a felony.  Id. at 17. 
6  Zerline Hughes, National and State Experts to Highlight Causes, Remedies for 
Racial  Disparities  in  Maryland’s  Criminal  Justice  System, 1 JUSTICE POLICY 
INSTITUTE (June 4, 2012) http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/3948 (citing Maryland 
Division Correction Annual Report, FY 2010). 
7  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2013), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html. 
8 Gary M. Lanigan, Commissioner, Offenders Characteristics Report, Offender 
Statistics-State of New Jersey (2013), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/offenderstatistics/2013/By%20Ethnicity 
Race%202013.pdf. 
9  JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, RACE AND IMPRISONMENT IN TEXAS: THE DISPARATE 
INCARCERATION OF LATINOS  AND AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE LONE STAR STATE, 
(Justice Policy Institute 2005) available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/05-02_rep_txraceimprisonment_ac-
rd.pdf (Citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RACE AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Human Rights Watch, 2002)). 
10  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County Quick Facts: South Carolina, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2013), available at  http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/45000.html. 
11 PROFILE OF INMATES IN INST. COUNT, S. C. DEP’T OF CORR. 2 (June 30, 2013), 
available at 
http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/InmatePopulationStas/ASOFInstitutionalCountProfi
le FY13.pdf. 
12 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County Quick Facts: Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2013) available at  http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47000.html. 
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And even in two of the states that rank among the lowest in 
terms of proportion of African-Americans, Rhode Island and 
Minnesota, they are overrepresented in prisons. In Rhode Island, only 
7% of the population is African-American,14 yet 29% of the inmates 
are,15 and in Minnesota, where African-Americans are just 5.5% of the 
population,16 they are 35% of those who are incarcerated.17   
We seem to care less when the constitutional rights of these 
indigent defendants are ignored because they are predominantly 
minorities. We seem to care less when prosecutors fail to comply with 
the mandates of Brady v. Maryland18 or their obligation to effect 
justice.19 And we seem to care less when judges treat defendants like 
numbers to be processed and thrown aside as quickly as possible. And 
we seem to not care that although African-Americans comprise 13% 
                                                                                                                   
13 DERRICK D. SCHOFIELD, TENN.: FY 2013 ANNUAL REP.,  DEP’T. OF CORR. 1, 6 
(2013), available at http://www.tn.gov/correction/pdf/AnnualReport2013.pdf.  
14 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County Quick Facts: Rhode Island, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU: STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013) available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/44000.html. 
15 R. I. DEP’T OF CORR. PLANNING & RESEARCH UNIT, ANN. POPULATION REP. 
(2013), available at 
http://www.doc.ri.gov/administration/planning/docs/FY13%20Annual%20Report.pd
f. 
16 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, State & County Quick Facts: Minnesota, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (2013), available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/27000.html. 
17 MINN. DEP’T OF CORR. ADULT INMATE PROFILE 1, 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/stats/documents/MinnesotaDepartmentofCorre
ctionsAdultInmateProfile01-01-2014.pdf. 
18 378 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963). Brady requires prosecutors to turn over any 
exculpatory evidence in their possession to the defense. What is typically referred to 
as Brady material includes any physical evidence or statements of prosecution 
witnesses that may lead to the impeachment of that witness by defense counsel. Id.   
19 Id. A prosecutor is unique in our justice system; unlike any other attorney whose 
loyalty is exclusively to the client they represent, the prosecutor has a dual 
obligation. Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct is titled, 
Special Responsibilities of the Prosecutor; the  first  Comment  is  unambiguous:    “A  
prosecutor has the responsibility as a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon specific 
evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 1 cmt. (2014). The earlier ABA 
Canons of Professional Ethics was even more direct as to the obligations of a 
prosecutor:    “The  suppression  of  facts  or  the  secreting of witnesses capable of 
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly  reprehensible.”  ABA CANONS OF 
PROF’L ETHICS, COMMENT 5 (1908) (emphasis added). 
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of the population of the country,20 the proportion of African-American 
inmates in our state and federal prisons is almost 3 times that 
number.21  
 
We care least of all, perhaps, in large urban areas such as 
Chicago/Cook County where over 80% of those incarcerated in 2012 
were African-American or Hispanic22 even though only 34.1% of the 
area’s   population  was non-white.23 Or in Los Angeles,   the   country’s  
most populous county, where 80% of inmates at the Los Angeles 
County Jail were black or Hispanic as of 2012;24 or in the   nation’s  
                                                 
20 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County QuickFacts: U.S.A., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2013), available at  http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. 
21 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PEOPLE IN PRISONS 1 
(January 2014), available at 
http://www.sentenceingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc 
factsAboutPrisons Jul2014.pdf. 
22 Characteristics of Inmates in the Cook County Jail, COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S 
REENTRY COUNCIL RES. BULLETIN, March 2011 at 3.  67% of jail admissions were 
African American, and 19% were Hispanic.  Id. The  Bulletin  states  that,  “The  typical  
inmate admitted to, and discharged from, the Cook County Jail is a single, African-
American  male  from  Chicago  averaging  32  years  old  at  admission.”    Id.  The 
Chicago  Cook  County  Public  Defender  Office  is  the  country’s  second  largest  with  
more than 500 attorneys.  GEORGE H. RYAN, REP. OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Preamble V (April 2002). 
23 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County Quick Facts: Cook County, Illinois,  U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU 2013, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17031.html. 
24 JAMES AUSTIN, THE JFA INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT AND FUTURE 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL POPULATION 15 (April 2012).  The population at the jail 
consists of those being held pretrial as well as those who have already been 
sentenced.  Id. at 2.  California prisons have long been in a state of crisis due to 
overcrowding; the Supreme Court in 2011 held that conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment and ordered the state to reduce its 
prison population by more than 30,000 inmates.  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 
(2011).  Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court and described the California prison 
situation as such:    “A  prison  that  deprives  prisoners  of  basic  sustenance,  including  
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no 
place  in  civilized  society.”    Id.  The California legislature responded with the 
passage of Assembly Bill 109 which is designed to shift the responsibility of housing 
low-risk inmates from the state to the counties.    AB  109  (California’s  Realignment  
Plan) is expected to lead to a 50% increase in the number of inmates in the Los 
Angeles County Jail. JAMES AUSTIN, THE JFA INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF THE 
CURRENT AND FUTURE LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL POPULATION 3 (April 2012).  As 
of January 2014, 71% of the population of LA County was White. State and County 
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capital where, as of January 2014, 91% of inmates housed by the D.C. 
Department of Corrections were African-American.25 
 
I. SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A. Expansion of the Sixth Amendment  
 
 The right to effective counsel is the foundation of our 
adversarial system, and nowhere is this more paramount than in our 
criminal process.26 If an individual accused of crime does not have a 
competent, well-prepared, zealous attorney by his or her side, the 
adversarial system   cannot   be   relied   upon   and   the   defendant’s   rights  
will be sacrificed. 
Even though the language of the Sixth Amendment would 
appear clear where it   states   that,   “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused  shall  enjoy  the  right…  to  have   the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defense,”27 a long and tedious process had occurred until it became 
clear that an indigent defendant who was unable to afford an attorney 
was entitled to have a lawyer, paid by the state, assigned to represent 
him.28 The Supreme Court had initially interpreted the language 
merely to mean that if a defendant were to be able to afford and 
provide private counsel, then that defendant had the right to assistance 
of counsel in the proceedings.29 As reasoned by the Court in United 
States v. Van Duzee, the   decision   to   enact   the  Amendment   had   “not  
                                                                                                                   
Quick Facts, Los Angeles County California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2013, available 
at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html, yet only 15% of the 
inmates of the jail were white.  JFA Institute, Evaluation, Id. at 15. 
25 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE POPULATION BY RACE (January 
2014).  Only 2.4% of inmates were White, Id., yet 42.9% of the District’s  residents  
are White. District of Columbia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State and County 
QuickFacts: District of Columbia (2013), available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/34000.html. 
26 E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 46 (1972) (The Supreme Court has 
noted that even the right of an accused to have a trial by jury is not as basic and 
fundamental to the constitutional guarantee to a fair trial as is the right to counsel).   
27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
28 Powell v. Alabama, 32 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
29 WILLIAM M. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 21 (1955). 
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contemplated that this [provision of counsel] should be done at the 
expense  of  the  government.”30  
The path toward Gideon was   laid   by   the   Supreme   Court’s  
decision in Powell v. Alabama that appointment of counsel to 
represent an indigent in a capital case was required by our 
Constitution.31 Powell involved the convictions of nine African-
American juveniles for the rape of two white women in Scottsboro, 
Alabama.32 Eight were tried and convicted and sentenced to death by 
electrocution within two weeks of the alleged crime.33 The Court 
emphasized the crucial import of defense counsel to our adversarial 
system, observing that: 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged 
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the 
aid of counsel he may put on trial without a proper 
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have 
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he does not know how to establish 
his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, 
                                                 
30 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891). See also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 611 n. 17 (1948) 
(Until 1938, the language in the Sixth Amendment was understood to mean the right 
of a defendant to be represented by retained counsel). 
31 Powell, 32 U.S. at 68–71.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 50. The attorneys who had represented the defendants had been selected by 
the trial judge and were not familiar with criminal matters, and had no time to 
properly prepare or investigate the charges.  The state ultimately dropped charges 
against four of the nine, and agreed to release the two defendants who were 12 and 
13  years  of  age  when  the  incident  occurred  on  the  condition  that  “they  leave  the  
State,  never  to  return.”    DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO:  A TRAGEDY OF THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 376–77 (1969). 
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how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, 
or those of feeble intellect.34 
Progress was made six years after Powell when the Court, in Johnson 
v. Zerbst,35 extended the right to counsel to apply to all federal felony 
prosecutions.36 However, shortly thereafter, a detour arose. The 
Court, in Betts v. Brady,37 declined to extend the Sixth Amendment 
right to state felony prosecutions except in those instances where the 
denial of counsel   would   be   “shocking to the universal sense of 
justice….”38 But then came Gideon v. Wainwright,39 presenting a rare 
occasion when the Supreme Court unequivocally reversed a prior 
decision of the Court;40 and it did so unanimously.41 In its landmark 
                                                 
34 Powell, 32 U.S. at 45.  In November, 2013, the Alabama Board of Pardons and 
Paroles voted to pardon the only three of the nine who still had convictions on their 
records. Gabrielle Levy, Scottsboro Boys Given Posthumous Pardon, UNITED PRESS 
INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 21, 2013, www.upi.com/blog/2013/11/21/Scottsboro-boys-
given-posthumous-pardon/3871385066865/print.  The Governor spoke in support of 
the pardons:    “While  we  could  not  take  back  what  happened  to  the  Scottsboro  Boys’  
80 years ago, we found a way to move it right moving forward. The pardons granted 
to the Scottsboro Boys today are long overdue. I appreciate the Pardons and Parole 
Board for continuing our progress today and officially granting these pardons.  
Today, the Scottsboro  Boys  have  finally  achieved  justice.”  OFFICE OF THE 
GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA,  Governor  Bentley’s  Statement  on  the  Pardoning  of  the  
Scottsboro Boys, (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2013/04/governor-bentley-signs-scottsboro-
boys-legislation/. 
35 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938). 
36 Id. 
37 316 U.S. 455, 468 (1942). 
38 Id. 
39 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
40 Id. The  judge  who  presided  over  Gideon’s  trial  was  correct  as  to  the  state  of  the  
law  at  that  time  when  he  responded  to  the  request  to  “appoint  counsel  to  represent 
me  in  this  trial.”    The  Court  replied:    “Mr.  Gideon,  I  am  sorry,  but  I  cannot  appoint  
counsel to represent you in this case.  Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only 
time the court can appoint counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is 
charged with a capital offense.  I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to 
appoint  counsel  to  defend  you  in  this  case.”    ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 
10 (Random House, Vintage Ed. 1966). The Supreme Court did note that Gideon 
“conducted  his  defense  about  as  well  as  could  be  expected  from  a  layman.” Gideon, 
372 U.S. at 336. 
41 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.This was especially startling given that the case which 
had been overruled, Betts, was a 6-3 decision. None of the 6 judges who formed the 
majority in Betts were still on the bench the time of Gideon, but two of the dissenters 
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holding, the Court concluded that the right of counsel established in 
the  Sixth  Amendment  was   applicable   as   to   “serious   charges” at the 
state   court   level   by   operation   of   the   Fourteenth   Amendment’s   Due  
Process Clause.42  The Court declared it an “an  obvious  truth” that  “in  
our adversary system of justice, any person hauled into court, who is 
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel 
is  provided  for  him.”43  
 
The Court extended the newly-mandated constitutional 
obligation of states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants by 
ruling in Argersinger v. Hamlin44 that no individual could be 
incarcerated, even were the charge to have been just a 
misdemeanor,45 without having been afforded the right to have had an 
attorney.46 The  Court  explained:  “We  are  by  no  means  convinced  that  
legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually 
leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex 
                                                                                                                   
– Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas – remained.  A clue to what the Court 
would decide in Gideon came from a case, Carnley v. Cochran, which the Court 
decided several months prior to Gideon and where one of the Justices wrote that, 
“[t]wenty years experience in the state and federal courts with the Betts v. Brady rule 
has  demonstrated  its  basic  failure  as  a  constitutional  guide.”  369  U.S.  506,  518  
(1962) (Black, J., concurring). 
42 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341.  Twenty two states had joined as amici in support of 
Clarence  Earl  Gideon’s  right  under  the  Federal  Constitution  to  counsel.    See Brief 
for the State Government et al. as Amici Curiae, 2–3, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 62-155).  As  a  result  of  the  Court’s  holding,  Clarence  Gideon  
was retried, this time with counsel, and found to be not guilty.  But the second trial 
occurred only after Gideon discharged the counsel that the American Civil Liberties 
Union had sent to represent him.  KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 88–89 (The New York Press 2013). 
Gideon ended up selecting a local lawyer who had personal acquaintances with 
several of the jurors. Id. at 89. 
43 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
44 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). 
45 Id.  The Court made it clear 7 years after Argersinger that  an  individual’s  
constitutional right to counsel only applied in cases where actual loss of liberty had 
occurred. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1969). Prior to Scott, there had 
been some confusion as to whether the right to counsel applied to charges where a 
sentence of imprisonment was authorized but not actually imposed. Justice Brennan 
dissented in Scott; he thought that states were to be required to provide counsel in a 
broader category of offenses, a much needed and long overdue reexamination of 
criminal statutes might result in a reclassification of minor offenses.  Id. at 388. 
46 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
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than  when   a   person   can   be   sent   off   for   six  months   or  more.”47 The 
Court made it clear that the Argersinger holding did not apply to 
charges where the loss of liberty was not involved.48 
 
 The years following Gideon brought a rapid and significant 
expansion of the various stages of a prosecution for which there was a 
constitutional right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment was held to 
apply during all of the critical stages of criminal proceedings 
including the process of custodial interrogation,49 lineup or other 
pretrial identification proceeding,50 a probation revocation hearing,51 
a preliminary hearing,52 and a parole revocation hearing.53  
 
In re Gault54 extended the right to counsel to juvenile cases, 
and even though Douglas v. California guaranteed the right to 
counsel during the first appeal of a conviction,55 it was not until 1985, 
                                                 
47 Id. at 33. The Court seemed to infer that the difficulties of confronting a defendant 
charged with a  misdemeanor may even be greater than for those charged with 
felonies: “The  volume  of  misdemeanor  cases,  far greater in number than felony 
prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the 
fairness  of  the  result.”  Id. 
48 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. In his concurrence, however, Justice Powell 
commented  that  the  Court’s  rationale  for  extending  the  right  to  counsel  
“foreshadows”  the  extension  to  all  petty  offenses.  Id. at 52. 
49 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498 (1966). 
50 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967). 
51 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). 
52 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). 
53 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973). 
54 287 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1967). The Court emphasized that children in fact needed more 
protection  than  adults,  and  noted  that  “under  our  Constitution,  the  condition  of  being  
a  boy  does  not  justify  a  kangaroo  court.”  Id. at 28. Whereas In re Gault only 
provides the mandate of counsel where defendants face incarceration, some states go 
further and require an attorney to be appointed to all juveniles in youth court 
proceedings. See, e.g.,  MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-201. 
55 California had a procedure where the only time an indigent would qualify for 
appointment of counsel on appeal would be if the appellate court were to make a 
determination that counsel would be of help to the defendant or to the court. Douglas 
v. California, 372 U.S. 354, 355 (1963). A defendant who was able to afford his own 
counsel was not, of course, required to have his case so prejudged by the court.  
Justice Douglas, in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court, rested the decision on 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment:    “[W]here  the  merits  of the one and only appeal an 
indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an 
unconstitutional    line  has  been  drawn  between  rich  and  poor.”  Id. at 357. In Ross v. 
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in Evitts v. Lucey, that the Court held that there was a guarantee of 
effective assistance of counsel on the same appeal.56  
 
In 2008, the Court, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, extended 
the right to apply to the defendant’s initial appearance before a 
judge.57 In 2010, the Court, in Padilla v. Kentucky, held that counsel 
were obligated to inform their client whether a guilty plea might carry 
a risk of deportation.58 And in 2012, the Court, in Missouri v. Frye59 
and Lafler v. Cooper,60 determined that the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel broadly applied to the plea-bargaining process.61 
 
B. Practical Effects of Changes to Sixth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
 
 The financial burdens placed on the states as a result of both 
Gideon and Argersinger were very substantial and have proven to be, 
in many instances, insurmountable. And somewhat predictable. 
Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, in a curt and to-the-point dissent 
in the 1973 case of Douglas v. California regarding the obligation to 
provide counsel for an indigent in the first appeal, wrote:    “[w]ith this 
new fetish for indigency, the Court piles an intolerable burden on the 
State’s  judicial  machinery.”62   
Within a few years after Gideon,  the  President’s  Commission  
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a report 
                                                                                                                   
Moffit, however, the Court held that the state is not required to appoint counsel for 
an indigent who is seeking a discretionary, second-tier appellate review. 417 U.S. 
600, 610 (1974). 
56 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
57 Compare Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) 
(extending application of the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel to a 
defendant’s  initial  appearance  before  a  judge)  with Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 
52, 54–55 (1961) (requiring that counsel be appointed in cases where the defendant 
is being arraigned on a case for which he may receive the death penalty). 
58 559 U.S. 356, 373–374 (2010). 
59 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–1408 (2012). 
60 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012). 
61 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985) (holding that the same two-prong 
test laid out in Strickland, infra, applied to a plea bargain scenario where the 
defendant  claims  that  were  it  not  for  counsel’s  errors,  there  was  a  reasonable  
probability that he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty). 
62 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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titled The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.63 The Commission’s  
conclusion was   clear:   “[t]he shortage of criminal lawyers, which is 
already severe, is likely to become more acute in the immediate 
future.”64 The concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Argersinger 
recognized   that   the  Court’s  holding  “could  have  a   seriously  adverse  
impact upon the day-to-day functioning of the criminal justice 
system.”65 Justice Rehnquist joined Powell in predicting that 
“backlogs,”   “bottle-necks,”   and   “chaos”   would   result   in   the   state  
courts.66 Justice Brennan also expressed concern and called upon law 
students to provide assistance in administering the increased 
representational needs of indigents accused of crime.67   
Surely, the Argersinger Court could well envision the havoc 
that would result from the holding – five years prior to the decision, 
the  President’s  Commission  on  Law  Enforcement  and  Administration 
of Justice had described the situation that had resulted from Gideon:   
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the 
almost total preoccupation in such a court with the 
movement of cases. . .  Inadequate attention tends to be 
given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting 
his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social 
risk he presents, or determining how to deal with him 
after conviction. . . .  Suddenly it becomes clear that for 
most defendants in the criminal process, there is scant 
concern for them as individuals. They are numbers on 
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their 
way.68 
 
                                                 
63 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1968).  
64 Id. at 370. 
65 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 52 (Powell, J., concurring). 
66 Id. at 55–56.  A different perspective was offered by then-Chief Justice Burger:  
“The  holding  of  the  Court  today  may  well  add  large  new  burdens  on  a  profession  
already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the 
burdens  placed  on  it.”    Id. at 44 (Burger, C.J., concurring.) 
67 Id. at 40–41 (Brennan J. concurring). 
68 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 63.  
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II. DETERMINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF “EFFECTIVE” 
REPRESENTATION 
 
A. Initial Lack of Clarity  
 
The question not answered by the Court in Powell, Gideon, or 
Argersinger, was what, if any, standards would be utilized to evaluate 
the quality of the counsel provided to indigents. The Circuit Courts of 
Appeal differed as to what, if any, proper requirements may be 
needed   to   evaluate   counsel’s   performance.69 In McMann v. 
Richardson, the Supreme Court finally made it clear that defendants 
who are confronting felony charges are entitled to the effective 
assistance of competent counsel.70 
 
 The   determination   of   just   what   “effective”   was   to   mean,  
however, was unclear and was subject to widely varying 
interpretations by the lower appellate courts. The Eighth Circuit, for 
example, observed that the standard for determining whether counsel 
had been ineffective in the representation of the client  “is  not  easily  
reduced   to   any   formula.” 71 One widely adopted test that had been 
used by appellate courts to determine if a conviction needed to be 
overturned, was stated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Wight.72 The Court concluded that the standard was 
                                                 
69 The D.C. Circuit, for example, was clear that even were appointed counsel to be 
negligent, the defendant was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right. Diggs v. 
Welch,  48  F.2d  667  (D.C.  Cir.  1945).  The  Court  emphasized  that,  “All  that  
amendment requires is that  the  accused  shall  have  the  assistance  of  counsel.”  Id. at 
668. 
70 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (emphasis added). McMann involved the claim of the 
defendants  that  their  guilty  pleas  had  occurred  to  their  counsel’s  wrongfully  
informing them that their coerced concessions could be admitted against them at 
trial.  The Court held that the issue was not whether the advice had been correct or 
incorrect,  but  rather  “whether  that  advice  was  within  the  range  of  competence  
demanded  of  attorneys  in  criminal  cases.” Id. at 771. 
71 Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Garton v. Swenson, 
497 F.2d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974)). In language that may be so general as to not 
be  of  great  help,  the  court  added  that  there  should  be  a  “professional  standard,”  
which  “tests  for  the  degree  of  competence  prevailing  among  those  licensed  to  
practice  before  the  bar.”  Johnson, 506 F.2d at 646. 
72 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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whether  or  not  “the  purported  representation  by  counsel  was such as 
to make the trial a farce  and  a  mockery  of  justice.”73 
 
B. Strickland v. Washington 
 
 The 1984 Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. 
Washington,   which   set   the   standard   for   “effective”   assistance   of  
counsel, was one of the most significant opinions ever issued by the 
Court.74 Prior to the decision, the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association and the American Civil Liberties Union had submitted an 
amicus brief requesting that the Court establish a high standard for 
counsel to meet in order to be providing effective assistance.75  
Entailing stringent requirements for the representation provided by 
defense counsel would have caused state and local governments to 
provide greater funding for indigent defense. 
 Standards were there for the taking. The American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) has promulgated several volumes of its 
Standards for Criminal Justice, one of which was directly applicable 
to the issue before the Court in Strickland: Providing Defense 
Services.76 The Standards reflect the rapid growth in the need for 
defense counsel for the indigent that had resulted from Gideon and 
Argersinger. These Standards are highly regarded and respected 
because they are: 
The result of careful drafting and review by 
representatives of all segments of the criminal justice 
system – judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, court 
personnel and academics active in criminal justice 
teaching and research. Circulation of the standards to a 
wide range of outside expertise guaranteed a rich array 
                                                 
73 Id. at 379. At one point, nine of eleven circuits were applying the farce and 
mockery of justice standard.  Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
74 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). 
75 Brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and the American Civil 
Liberties Union As Amici Curiae for Respondent, at 6–7, Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No.82-1554). 
76 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 1992). 
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of comment and criticism which has greatly 
strengthened the final product.77 
Other professional organizations have also enacted standards relating 
to the performance of counsel in defense representation.78 
 
 The Court, however, was dismissive of such standards, 
acknowledging  the  ABA  Standards  as  “guides  to  determining  what  is  
reasonable,”79 while  making   it   clear   that   these  were   “only guides.”80  
The Court then proceeded to explain its conception of standards in a 
most disconcerting  and  perplexing  manner:  “[i]ndeed, the existence of 
detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the 
overriding  mission  of  vigorous  advocacy  of  the  defendant’s  cause.”81  
The Court did not elaborate or clarify, perhaps because it would have 
been most difficult to explain. How would a standard requiring 
counsel to adequately communicate with a client, properly investigate 
the facts and the law involved in the case, or to locate and speak with 
relevant   witnesses   possibly   “distract   counsel”   from   engaging   in  
“vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause?”82 
                                                 
77 Id. at ix. 
78 See, e.g., NATI’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES 
FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (2011).  
79 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
80 Id. (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 689. 
82 Justice  Marshall’s  dissent  sharply  criticized  the  Court’s  failure  to  adopt  
particularized standards: 
 
To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal 
defendant   must   behave   “reasonably”   and   must   act   like   “a  
reasonably  competent  attorney…is  to  tell   them  almost  nothing.  In  
essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to assess 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own 
intuitions  regarding  what  constitutes  “professional”  representation,  
and has discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed 
standards governing the performance of defense counsel. 
 
Id. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Harry Blackmun joined the majority 
in Strickland even  though  he  had  previously  noted  that  the  “state  is  responsible  for  
the  public  defender’s  office  and  can  attempt  to  ensure  that  clients  receive  effective  
assistance of counsel, for example, by hiring qualified personnel, providing 
sufficient funding, and enforcing strict standards of competence.”    Polk  County  v.  
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 In utter disregard for the quality of representation that is 
provided those accused of crime, the Court held that even were the 
level of performance of defense counsel to be so poor and not 
functioning in accordance with Sixth Amendment guarantees, a 
resulting conviction was nevertheless not to be reversed unless it has 
been demonstrated that there was a “reasonable   probability   that,   but  
for   the   counsel’s   unprofessional   errors,   the   result of the proceeding 
would   have   been   different.”83 Yet, even the instructions from the 
Court as to how the incompetency of counsel was to be assessed 
showed callousness to stark realities. There was to be a strong 
presumption   that   counsel’s   representation was constitutionally 
adequate,84 and: 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s   performance   must   be  
highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant 
to second-guess counsel’s  assistance  after  conviction  or  
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, 
examining   counsel’s   defense   after   it   has   proved  
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or 
omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every 
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight,  to  reconstruct  the  circumstances  of  counsel’s  
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s  perspective at the time. . . . [T]he defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances,   the   challenged   action   “might be 
considered  sound  trial  strategy.”85 
 
But even if the poor, minority defendant who was represented by an 
overburdened,   underfinanced   public   defender’s   office,   were   to  
                                                                                                                   
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 335 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  In 
Strickland, Brennan opined that he did not consider the concept of outlining 
particularized standards to be sufficiently flexible as to accommodate the wide 
disparity in situations that lead to ineffective assistance claims. Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 703–04 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
83 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
84 Id. at 690–91  (“[T]he  [appellate]  court should recognize that counsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  professional  judgment”). 
85 Id. at 689 (citation omitted). 
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conquer the odds in overcoming the presumption of competency, the 
second prong of the Strickland test must also be met.86 Somehow, it 
must be shown that had the   defendant’s   attorney   been   a   competent  
one, the conviction would not have occurred.87 An appeals court, 
therefore, is required to speculate how the trial might have been 
conducted had the defendant been provided with a competent counsel.   
 
Yet the very fact that the counsel may well have been 
ineffective could have impacted the entire proceeding in such 
pervasive ways that it is simply not possible to gauge the degree of 
prejudice. How is it possible to ascertain what the results of an 
effective investigation or thorough preparation of a case would have 
been? How can an appellate court judge know how a competent 
lawyer would have been able to cross-examine the key prosecution 
witness in ways that could well have challenged   the   witness’  
credibility? The failure to have conducted an investigation which 
would have uncovered crucial defense witnesses may be the precise 
reason that the trial transcript will not reveal any prejudice for the 
court to review.88 The sins of the ineffective counsel are most typically 
those of omission, rather than ones of commission. Yet all these 
concerns  fall  at  the  altar  of  finality;;  the  Court’s  rigid  application  of  the  
outcome-determinative   test   “reflects   the profound importance of 
finality in  criminal  proceedings.”89 
                                                 
86 Id. at 687. See also, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
87 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
88 An exception exists regarding the need to show prejudice in cases where the 
defendant  claims  that  there  was  ineffectiveness  due  to  counsel’s  conflict  of  interest.    
The Supreme Court, in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490–91, (1978), has 
recognized the difficulties in demonstrating prejudice in conflict cases: 
 
[T]he evil – it bears repeating – is in what the advocate finds 
himself compelled to refrain from doing; not only at trial but also 
as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing 
process.  It may be possible in some cases to identify from the 
record   the   prejudice   resulting   from   an   attorney’s   failure   to  
undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the 
sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge 
intelligently   the   impact   of   a   conflict   on   the   attorney’s  
representation of a client. 
 
89 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (emphasis added). 
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 The Strickland Court seemed determined to emphasize its 
message that concern with those who had received ineffective 
assistance   was   not   the   Court’s primary focus. The Court’s   message  
was indeed a clear one:  judicial review of claimed Sixth Amendment 
violations was to be limited, and relief should occur only in the rarest 
of circumstances.90 The Court seemed to issue what could 
appropriately be deemed a caveat: 
 
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into 
attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its 
evaluation would encourage the proliferation of 
ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved 
unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come 
to be followed by a second trial,   this  one  of   counsel’s  
unsuccessful  defense.  Counsel’s  performance  and  even  
willingness to serve could be adversely affected. 
Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for 
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and 
impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage 
the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the 
trust between attorney and client.91 
 
Trust, I would suggest, would best be won if the defendant could rest 
assured that counsel would be doing everything that should be done in 
providing representation. Trust does not come easy for the defendant 
who may meet his public defender in a jail cell with many others 
present92 and where the defendant knows that the same state that paid 
                                                 
90 Id. at 694–695. 
91 Id. at 690. 
92 This initial interview that counsel has with the client is of great import. See, e.g., 
NATI’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, Guideline 2.2, Initial Interview (2011) 
(counsel needs to be familiar with the elements of the offense, the potential 
punishment the defendant may be facing, the charging documents, any 
recommendations made by any bail agency regarding pre-trial release, and should 
provide the client with the crucial information concerning the case. All relevant data 
regarding  a  bail  application,  such  as  the  accused’s  ties  to  the  community,  family  
relationships, job history must be ascertained. Counsel ought to also ascertain any 
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the salaries of the police officer who arrested him as well as the 
prosecutor who is pursuing the case, also pays the defender.  
 
Trust must be earned, especially when race is a factor. A poor 
black defendant is not automatically going to perceive the white 
lawyer assigned to his case as one who will provide the highest level 
of representation. If the defendant gets the message that his counsel is 
not going to be held accountable for the quality of their assistance, 
then the client may well distrust their court-appointed attorney all the 
more. An accused who does not trust their counsel is unlikely to be 
completely forthcoming as to what had occurred regarding the alleged 
crime, and is also less likely to heed the advice of counsel.93 It is 
typical for professionals to have specific standards they must adhere 
to;;  the  attorney  who  is  assigned  to  safeguard  one’s  liberty  ought  not  to  
be the exception.94 
 
 Courts are not highly deferential when evaluating the work of a 
doctor, an architect, or an accountant; why should the work of a 
defense attorney be treated differently? The injury suffered by a 
defendant whose liberty may have been sacrificed due to an 
incompetent attorney suffers far more than the client of a negligent 
accountant or architect. This author suggests that race may well play a 
factor in the courts’   treatment   of   indigents   claiming   ineffective  
assistance. It is especially ironic that attorneys who actively litigate 
claims that other professionals failed to act appropriately, are 
somehow themselves provided with a presumption of competence. As 
we shall see, such a presumption may not be at all warranted. 
  
Also problematic, and deeply disturbing, is the Strickland 
Court’s   message   to   defense   counsel   and   to   appellate   courts   that   in  
cases where the prosecution case is a very strong one, the quality of 
                                                                                                                   
possible witnesses who need to be located and if there has been any improper police 
investigative  processes  which  may  affect  the  defendant’s  right). 
93 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-3.1 (3d ed. 
1991): “Nothing  is  more  fundamental  to  the  lawyer-client relationship than the 
establishment of trust  and  confidence.”    See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (counsel can best represent a defendant if there is a 
relationship which is based on trust and confidence.) 
94 The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice do, in fact, instruct 
that  “defense  counsel  should  seek  to  establish  a  relationship  of  trust  and  confidence  
with  the  accused.”    Standard  4-3.1(a) (3d ed. 1991). 
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counsel’s   representation   need   not   be   an   issue.   Courts   are   invited   to  
look at the prejudice prong first whenever  it  is  “easier  to  do  so,”95 and 
when  the  court  determines  that  the  prosecutor’s  case  was  strong, there 
is  no  need  to  “grade  counsel’s performance.”96 If a defendant is clearly 
guilty, then, ipso facto, there can be no prejudice caused by an 
ineffective counsel.97  
 
Yet it could well be that the very reason that the record shows 
no indication of reasonable doubt is that the counsel was ineffective, 
unprepared, inept, and simply unable to provide an adequate defense.  
Ironically, it is the defendant who is confronted by the strongest case 
against him who is most in need of the zealous and vigorous defender.  
Yet it is in those very instances where appellate courts do not even 
attempt to ascertain the ineffectiveness of defense counsel.   
 
Why are we so willing to dismiss the import of assessing the 
quality of counsel provided to those who seem to have little chance of 
successfully confronting the state? Is not the Sixth Amendment 
applicable to anyone charged with a crime, even the clearly guilty? 
Has the Sixth Amendment been rewritten so as to provide the right to 
effective assistance only to the innocent? 
 
III. CURRENT CRISIS IN REPRESENTATION PROVIDED INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS 
 
A. The Impact of Strickland v. Washington 
 
 Rather than lead to an improvement in the quality of 
representation provided defendants, Strickland accepted the status quo 
– or worse.98 The  Court  informed  that  “the  proper  measure  of  attorney  
                                                 
95 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
96 Id. 
97 The Strickland Court held that in order for a defendant to show a constitutional 
violation of their right to effective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show 
the  court  that  the  lawyer’s  representation  was  prejudicial,  and  “there  is  a  reasonable  
probability that, but  for  Counsel’s  unprofessional  errors,  the  result  of  the  proceeding  
would  have  been  different.”  Id. at 694. 
98 The American Bar Association published a report some years after Strickland that 
addressed  the  decision’s  apparent  leniency  on  the  quality  of  representation; RICHARD 
KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE INDIGENT 
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performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing 
professional   norms.”99 Therefore, if the norm is that overburdened 
public defenders are simply unable to provide an effective and 
competent defense, then a claim that in any particular case the counsel 
was ineffective would not warrant relief. It was as though the Court 
failed to heed its own warning 44 years earlier that incompetent 
lawyering  “could  convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and 
nothing   more   than   a   formal   compliance   with   the   Constitution’s  
requirement  that  an  accused  be  given  the  assistance  of  counsel.”100 
  
The Supreme Court’s   coupling   of   the   “presumption”   that  
counsel is effective with the requirement that counsel need do no more 
than   comply   with   “prevailing   professional   norms,”   has   created   a  
situation where substandard representation is routine.101 Nothing more 
than that is expected; not by overburdened defenders of one another, 
nor by poor, minority defendants.102   
 
B. The Extent of the Crisis 
 
The current U.S. Attorney General, Eric Holder, the head of 
the office responsible for prosecuting indigent defendants in the 
federal courts throughout the country,   recently   wrote   that,   “the   full  
promise of the rights guaranteed under Gideon has yet to be fully 
realized…as  a  result,  children  and  adults   regularly  enter  our  criminal  
justice system without knowledge of their rights or an understanding 
of  the  charges  and  potential  sentences  that  they  face.”103  
                                                                                                                   
DEFENSE CRISIS 25  (1993)  (“The long-term neglect and underfunding of indigent 
defense has created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in many states throughout 
the country.”). 
99 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
100 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). 
101 Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented in Strickland and was highly critical of the 
decision of the Court. Strickland, 466 U.S. at  713  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The 
only justification the majority itself provides for its proposed presumption is that 
undue receptivity to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too 
many defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the courts with 
frivolous suits.”). 
102 See, e.g., Jonathan Rapping, Redefining Success as a Public Defender:  A 
Rallying Cry for These Most Committed to Gideon’s Promise, THE CHAMPION, June 
2012, at 30, 33 (describing his experience with public defender offices in the South). 
103 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Reflections on Gideon – A Watershed Moment, THE 
CHAMPION, June 2012, at 56. 
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And such views know no party affiliation; Dick Thornburgh, 
the Republican Attorney General under both President Ronald Reagan 
and George Bush, recently wrote that   “the   hopes   expressed   post-
Gideon remain  largely  unfulfilled.”104 The Civil Rights Division of the 
United States Department of Justice has noted in a Statement of 
Interest regarding a 2013 case in a Federal District Court in Seattle 
that, “claims  of  deprivation  of  the  right  to  counsel…are part of a crisis 
impacting  public  defender  services  nationwide.” 105 
  
The organized bar, at all levels, has surely taken note for years.  
The first comprehensive, national analysis of criminal defense funding 
was conducted in 1973 by the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association.106 The Other Face of Justice minced no words:   
 
The resources allocated to indigent defense services 
have been found grossly deficient in light of the needs 
of adequate and effective representation.  Relatively 
few indigent defendants have the benefit of 
investigation and other expert assistance in their 
defense. Their advocates are overburdened, 
undertrained, and underpaid, and as recent studies have 
shown, the poor have as little confidence in such 
advocates, who are often hand-picked by the same 
authority which pronounces their sentence, as they do 
in the inherent fairness of the American criminal justice 
system.107 
 
Most recently, the President of the American Bar Association wrote to 
Attorney General Eric Holder in October, 2013, that,   “[t]here can be 
no denying that the indigent defense system in the United States is in 
                                                 
104 Dick Thornburgh, Reflections on Gideon: A Vigorous and Capable Prosecution 
and Defense, THE CHAMPION, June 2012, at 57. 
105 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOC. 
NO. 332, STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES: WILBUR V. CITY OF 
MOUNT VERNON 4 (2013).  
106 LAURENCE A. BENNER & BETH LYNCH NEARY, NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER 
ASS’N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 1 (1973). 
107 Id. at 70. 
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crisis.”108 The letter was written in response to the vote in February of 
2013 by the ABA policy-making   House   of   Delegates   to   “[u]rge 
Congress to establish an independent federally funded Center for 
Indigent Defense Services for the purpose of assisting state, local, 
tribal and territorial governments in carrying out their constitutional 
obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel of the defense of 
the indigent accused in criminal, juvenile, and civil commitment 
proceedings.”109 The ABA President could not have been more clear:  
“We, as a nation of laws, have not kept the promise of Gideon that the 
right  to  counsel  is  fundamental  and  essential  to  a  fair  trial.”110 
 
 To be sure, academics have taken note of this crisis, and the 
literature is filled with law review articles with titles such as Gideon’s 
Muted Trumpet;111 Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled;112 Gideon at 40:  
Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise;113 The Silence of Gideon’s 
Trumpet;114 Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away;115 The Emperor 
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional 
                                                 
108 Letter from James Silkenat, President, American Bar Association, to Eric H. 
Holder,  U.S.Att’y  Gen.  (Oct.  15,  2013)  (on  file  with  American  Bar  Association)  
available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013oct15_indige
ntdefensecommission_l.authcheckdam.pdf. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Victoria Nourse, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1417, 1431 (1999) 
(noting that Gideon states  that  it  is  simply  “obvious”  that  a  defendant  who  is  too  
poor  to  afford  representation  cannot  be  assured  a  “fair”  trial). 
112 Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2000) (noting the vast amount of 
inefficiencies that still permeate the right to effective counsel after Gideon). 
113 Ellen S. Podgor, Gideon at 40:  Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 131, 133 (2004) (noting that a survey on Gideon unveiled significant 
challenges for modern lawyers practicing indigent criminal defense). 
114 Jordan Glaser, Note, The Silence of Gideon’s Trumpet:  The Courts Inattention to 
Systemic Inequities Causing Violations of Speedy Trial Rights in Vermont v. Brillon, 
129 S.Ct. 1283 (2009), 89 NEB. L. REV. 396, 414 (2010) (noting that inequities in the 
criminal justice system ensure that defendants who can afford counsel are almost 
always better off than those who cannot). 
115 Stephen B. Bright, Stephen O. Kinnard & David A. Webster, Keeping Gideon 
From Being Blown Away:  Prospective Challenges to Inadequate Representation 
May Be Our Best Hope, 4 CRIM. JUST. 10, 48 (1990) (noting  that  the  “noble  ideal”  in  
Gideon may not be feasible because of the current number of poor defendants). 
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Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel;116 Gideon’s Unfulfilled 
Mandate;117 After Half A Century, Gideon’s Promise Remains 
Elusive;118 and, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. 
Wainwright.119 Authors seem to attempt to best one another in their 
desires to emphasize how severely our criminal justice system has 
departed from the hopes that were raised after the   Supreme  Court’s  
Gideon decision. 
 
IV. TAKING NOTICE OF SUBSTANDARD PRACTICES 
 
 What does this failure of our justice system to live up to the 
promise of Gideon actually mean to the poor defendant who is 
provided with court-appointed counsel?  
 
A. Recurring Problems in Florida  
 
In May of 2013, the Florida Supreme Court, after reviewing 26 
volumes of testimony, documents, statistics and expert opinions in 
Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State of 
Florida,120 concluded that the evidence illustrated that the attorneys in 
Miami-Dade County were   consistently   “unable   to   interview   clients,  
                                                 
116 Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes:  The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
625, 627 (1986) (acknowledging the challenge of upholding the Sixth Amendment 
promise in Gideon in the face of underfunded agencies providing defense). 
117 Virginia E. Sloan, Cait Clarke, & Daniel Engelberg, Gideon’s  Unfulfilled  
Mandate, Time for a New Consensus, 31 WTR HUM. RTS. 3, 3 (2004) (showing that, 
after Gideon, cases still exist where indigent defendants receive either ineffective or 
no counsel whatsoever). 
118 Norman L. Reimer After  A  Half  Century,  Gideon’s  Promise  Remains  Elusive, 
THE CHAMPION,  Feb.  2012,  at  7,  (“As  much  as  Gideon was promising a 
breakthrough, it remains a promise unfulfilled.”). 
119 Stephen B. Bright, Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2155 (2013) (claiming that the system 
of Sixth Amendment rights resulting from Gideon is  lacking  in  “legitimacy  and  
credibility”  and  “undeserving  of  respect”). 
120 115 So.3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013). The Public Defender office had filed motions to 
be relieved of the statutory responsibility to represent indigents in non-capital felony 
cases due to the excessive caseload which had resulted from insufficient funding.  
Section 27.51(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) requires the public defender to represent all 
indigents arrested or charged with crimes that could result in imprisonment. Id. at 
265, n.2. 
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conduct investigations, take depositions, prepare mitigation or counsel 
clients about pleas offered at arraignments.”121  
 
The Court characterized the lack of effective representation as 
“nonrepresentation,”122 which, therefore, constituted a denial of the 
actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the Sixth 
Amendment.123 Not choosing to mince words, the Court found that the 
evidence   is   “a   damning   indictment   of   the   poor   quality   of   trial 
representation that is being afforded to indigent   defendants.”124 The 
Court emphasized that the poor quality of representation was not 
confined to isolated instances but rather revealed systemic failings.125   
  
The Florida   Supreme  Court’s   decision confirmed what many 
observers  of   the  state’s  criminal  defense  services   long  knew.  A  2011  
report by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
concluded   that   “Florida’s   county   courts   are   consistently   sacrificing  
due process for case-processing speed. The problem is pervasive[,] but 
particularly   evident   in   larger   counties.”126  Eighty-two percent of the 
arraignments  in  Florida’s  courts  lasted  for  three  minutes  or  less.127  
 
In their haste to move cases to conclusion, trial judges  didn’t  
even inform defendants of their right to an attorney 28% of the time,128 
even though the right to counsel provided in the Florida state 
constitution is broader than the Sixth Amendment right as interpreted 
by the federal courts.129 
                                                 
121 Id. at 278. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 274. 
124 Id. at 274, n.8. 
125 Bennett Brummer, who was the elected chief of the Public Defender Office in 
Miami-Dade  County  for  32  years  until  2009,  had  filed  his  first  motion  for  “relief  
from  excessive  caseloads”  in  1978. KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 91–92 (The New Press 2013). 
126 ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDEN, THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE & WASTE IN 
FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14 (2011). 
127 Id. at 23, tbl.12. 
128 Id. at 22 (noting that judges were reluctant to inform defendants of the 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel or to inquire whether they could afford 
a lawyer). 
129 Id. at 7 (noting that, while the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to only 
require appointed counsel in cases where the defendant loses liberty, the Florida 
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 What is so tragically disappointing about the Florida example 
is the state government’s   response   to   the   decades   of   litigation   by  
public defender offices to obtain greater funding to represent indigent 
defendants. This author maintains that because such a high percentage 
of those accused of crime in the state are minorities, the state has 
consistently fought such attempts for increased funding. The 
constitutional rights of these Black and Hispanic defendants were 
apparently not of concern.   
 
The Legislature in 2003 enacted what is not only a rather 
remarkable piece of legislation, but one of questionable 
constitutionality as well. Florida statutory law attempts to prevent state 
courts from granting relief to public defenders who claim that their 
excessive caseloads prevent their clients from being afforded their 
Sixth Amendment right to effective   counsel:   “In   no   case   shall   the  
court   approve   a   withdrawal   by   the   public   defender…   based   solely  
upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender 
or   regional   counsel.”130 The State therefore acknowledged the 
inadequacy of funding as well as the resulting excessive workload and 
simply moved to prohibit the courts from acting to rectify the 
situation. The   state’s   intransigence   is   all   too   typical,   and   all too 
common to be shocking. But   government’s   lack   of   concern   for   the  
constitutional rights of those accused of crime is appalling…and  
increasing.  
 
B. Mississippi 
 
 Take, for example, Mississippi. A Report prepared by the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund titled Assembly Line Justice:  
Mississippi’s   Indigent   Defense Crisis, concluded that the Gideon 
guarantees   to   counsel   are   “functionally   meaningless.”131 The Report 
found that public defenders lacked sufficient funds to perform the 
most basic of investigations or to conduct legal research.132 The  state’s  
                                                                                                                   
constitution requires appointment of counsel in all cases where there is any 
possibility that the defendant may be incarcerated). 
130 5  West’s  F.S.A.  §  27.5303(1)(d)  (2014). 
131 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: 
MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 6 (2003). 
132 Id. at 6. Similar problems occurred when the clients were juveniles. Id. at 12–14. 
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substandard representation led to lawyers who were unable to meet 
with their clients, properly prepare bail applications, or to file 
necessary motions.133 The inadequate resources were in sharp contrast 
to   the   state’s   funding   for   the   prosecutors’   offices   which   included  
money for expert witnesses, a state-of-the-art crime lab, and all 
litigation and support services.134 
 
C. The Racial Impact in Washington State 
 
 As in many states, race is at the heart of the problems in the 
state of Washington. An intensive analysis by the Task Force on Race 
and the Criminal Justice System – which was comprised of groups as 
varied  as  the  Seattle  City  Attorney’s  Office,  the  Washington  State  Bar  
Association, the Washington State Access to Justice Board, 
Washington Women Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Washington, and the Administrative Office of the Courts – led to the 
issuance of a report in 2011.135 The report  concluded  that,  “the  fact  of  
racial and ethnic disproportionality in our criminal justice system is 
indisputable.”136 Of particular import are the following: 
 
1. Of those convicted of felonies related to drug 
offenses, African-Americans were 62% more 
likely to receive a prison sentence than similarly 
situated Whites.137 
 
2. In the state’s   juvenile   justice   system,   similarly  
situated minorities received harsher sentences 
than their White peers.138 
 
                                                 
133 Id. at 8. In many parts of the state, if counsel wished to engage an investigator or 
psychiatrist, the lawyer would have to pay for the assistance. Id. at 6. Most 
commonly, counsel would simply conduct no investigation when the client 
specifically requested one. Id. at 10. 
134 Id. at 17.   
135 Research Working Group & Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System, Preliminary  Report  on  Race  and  Washington’s  Criminal  Justice  System, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012). 
136 Id. at 627. 
137 Id. at 628. 
138 Id. 
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3. Pretrial release decisions systematically 
disadvantaged minorities.139 
 
4. Minorities were more likely to be searched 
when stopped for traffic investigations.140 
 
5. Although African-Americans comprised only 
3% of the general population in the State, they 
constituted 28% of the prison population.141 
 
6. In King County (Seattle, Washington), 
prosecutors recommended harsher sentences for 
African-American defendants, and were 75% 
less likely to recommend alternative to 
incarceration sentences for African-Americans 
than for similarly situated Whites.142 
 
7. The  Seattle  Police  Department’s  focus  on  crack  
cocaine arrests to the “virtual exclusion” of 
heroin, powder cocaine, and methamphetamine, 
led to gross racial disparities in drug 
enforcement because 73.4% of those arrested 
for delivering crack cocaine were African-
American.143 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 629. 
141 Id. at 634 (noting that Washington had led the country in the disproportionate 
representation of blacks in prison during 1980). 
142 Id. at 647 (citing ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL, RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY CASES IN KING COUNTY 4 (1995), 
available at 
http://ww.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/Novemeber%201995%20Report.pdf). 
143 Id. at 652 (citing Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, 
and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 3 (2005)). 
“By  contrast,  only  20%  of  those  arrested  for  delivering  other  drugs  were  Black.”  Id. 
Klein    
192  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:2 
 
 
D. Racial  Bias  in  Virginia’s  Criminal  Justice  System 
 
At the end of 2013, another report was issued highlighting 
racial   biases   and   inequalities   in   a   state’s   criminal   justice   system:    
Virginia’s  Justice  System:  Expensive, Ineffective and Unfair.144  This 
report from the Justice Policy Institute concluded, “African Americans 
are over-represented at each stage of the Virginia criminal justice 
system.”145 Specifically, even though only 20% of the overall 
population of Virginia is African-American, over 60% of state prison 
inmates and 47% of all those arrested are African-American.146 And, 
as was true in the Washington report,147 the Virginia Report concluded 
that the racial imbalance in arrests for drug offenses was a function of 
the priorities of the police and the justice system, and was not 
indicative of greater actual usage by the African-American 
population.148 The greatest disparities occur in the juvenile justice 
system; 70% of juveniles who were committed to serve time in 
detention facilities were African-American although only 20% of the 
juvenile population in the state was African-American.149 
 
The poor quality of criminal defense services for indigents is, 
once again, thought to be a prime factor in the over-incarceration of 
African-Americans.150 For every White person incarcerated in 
Virginia’s   state   prisons,   there   are   six  African-Americans.151 Reports 
dating back to 2003 have concluded that the quality of representation 
provided to indigents in the state is lacking;152 defender services were 
                                                 
144 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, VIRGINIA’S JUSTICE SYSTEM:  EXPENSIVE, 
INEFFECTIVE AND UNFAIR (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/va_justice_system_ex
pensive_ineffective_and_unfair_final.pdf.  
145 Id. at 1. 
146 Id.  For certain crimes, the racial imbalance was even higher; for example, 76% of 
all robbery arrests were of African-Americans. Id. at 11. 
147 Research Working Group & Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System, supra note 135, at 652. 
148 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 144, at 12. 
149 Id. at 8. 
150 Id. at 6. 
151 Id. at 12. 
152 Id. at 6 (citing Betsy Wells Edwards, Virginia’s  Indigent  Defense  Delivery  System  
Receives Poor Grades from VIDC, 51 VIRGINIA’S LAWYERS MAGAZINE 36 (2003)). 
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not found to be on equal footing with the funding provided to 
prosecutors.153  
 
And, as is all too common in many states, when private 
counsel are appointed by the court to represent indigent defendants, 
there  is  a  “cap”  on  the  maximum  amount  that  they  can  get  paid  in  any  
particular case.154 Pay caps act as disincentives to quality lawyering; 
the amount of time properly spent by counsel on the preparation or 
investigation of a case may well exceed the number of hours for which 
counsel can get reimbursed. The private, court-appointed counsel may 
therefore choose to devote time to clients who are not indigent and 
who can be billed for every hour of representation that counsel devotes 
to that case. 
 
E. Insufficient Funding for Counsel in New York 
 
But such deplorable conditions are not limited  to  America’s 
south.  In Hurrell-Harring v. New York, indigent defendants in five 
counties in New York State brought a class action claiming that the 
system of public defense had presented an unacceptable risk that the 
plaintiffs were being denied their constitutional right to counsel.155 
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the allegations that 
counsel was so inadequate at critical stages of the proceedings were 
sufficient to justify the inference that there was a basic denial of rights 
required by Gideon.156 Furthermore, the Court found that the 
arraignment process was to be considered a critical stage even when 
there was not any guilty plea elicited.157 It is not a matter of inadequate 
representation;;  rather  that  the  “numerous  allegations  to  the  effect  that  
counsel, although appointed, were uncommunicative, made virtually 
no   efforts   on   their   nominal   clients’   behalf   during   the   very   critical  
period subsequent to arraignment, and, indeed, waived important 
                                                 
153 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 144, at 5. 
154 Id. 
155 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y 2010). Id. at 219. 
156 Id.at 227.  
157 Id.at  223.  One  of  the  most  basic  rights  in  the  Sixth  Amendment’s  mandate  that  
the  accused  be  “informed  of  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation.”  The  
arraignment is the stage where the defendant is formally informed of the charges 
against him; time is often required to explain and discuss the particular sections of 
the  state’s  criminal  code  that  will  form  the  basis  of  the  prosecution.   
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rights without authorization from their clients, may be reasonably 
understood to allege non-representation rather than ineffective 
representation.”158  
 
 In this landmark litigation, a settlement between the parties 
was reached in 2015 which provided for the New York State Office of 
Indigent Legal Services to guarantee counsel at arraignment, institute 
quality standards, and insure that public defenders have manageable 
caseloads.159 The only problem was that the counties were afforded a 
time period of seven and a half years to comply. 160 Violations of the 
Sixth Amendment, ought not, in this author’s view, be tolerated for 
even one day, much less for seven and a half years.  
 
It should be noted that in 2013, approximately half of those 
incarcerated in New York were African-American,161 despite that 
group’s constituting only  17.5%  of  the  state’s  population.162 
 
 Whereas it is not uncommon for public defender offices 
themselves to acknowledge that inadequate funding leads to 
ineffective representation, it is very unusual for the funding source 
itself to admit that it does not provide sufficient funds. But that is just 
what was done in 2013 by Suffolk County, the second largest county 
by area in New York State, which includes the infamously wealthy 
Hamptons.  
 
The Acting County Attorney, while realizing both the 
constitutional as well as the statutory obligation to provide counsel at 
the defendants’   arraignments, acknowledged that providing “counsel  
at first appearance has proven to be a challenge in   certain   courts” 
                                                 
158 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdd/states/36000.html. 
159 Joel Stashenko, Judge Approves Settlement Over Indigent Criminal Defense, 
New York Law Journal, March 18, 2015. 
160 Id.  
161 STATE OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION, UNDER CUSTODY REPORT 5 (2013), available at 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2013/UnderCustody_Report_2013.pdf. 
162 U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts: New York, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html (last 
revised Jul. 08, 2014). 
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within the County given the limitations in resources.163 There is no 
statewide public defender office in New York, and the counties 
themselves are responsible for funding indigent defense. Yet the 
Acting County Attorney admitted that adequate funding was a 
“perennial   problem”   and   that additional money was needed   “to hire 
competent attorneys and supply them with the resources that are 
needed   to   render   effective   assistance   of   counsel.”164  In a shocking 
admission, the County admitted that the goal of a special grant that 
was   being   sought   from   the   state   was   to   “realize   the   mandate”   as  
envisioned by the Court in Gideon.165  
 
Fifty years after Gideon,   one   of   the   country’s   largest   and  
wealthiest counties acknowledged that it has yet to comply with the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. And those who were the 
“victims”   of   the   noncompliance   were   disproportionately   African-
American – by a factor of four.166 
  
Things are hardly better in adjoining Nassau County, also one 
of the wealthiest counties in the country and the second most populous 
in the state outside the city of New York.167 In   2013,   the   County’s  
First Appearance   [at   Arraignment]   Plan   admitted   that   the   “sheer  
volume   of   arrests”   presented   “severe   challenges”   at   the   time   of   an  
                                                 
163 Letter from Paul J. Margiotta, Acting County Attorney, County of Suffolk, to 
Karen Jackusack, Office of Indigent Legal Services, Albany New York (Feb. 14, 
2013), Request for Grant Aid by the County of Suffolk, at 2.  
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 In 2012, approximately 32% of those who were incarcerated in Suffolk County 
were African-American. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF CORRECTION, ARRESTS, 
CONVICTIONS AND JAIL INMATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY (2013). Yet Afican-
Americans were only 8.2% of the County population. U.S. Census Bureau, State and 
County QuickFacts: Suffolk County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36103.html (last revised Jul. 08 
2014). 
167 The population of Nassau was 1,340,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, State and 
County QuickFacts: Nassau County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36059.html (last revised Jul. 08 
2014). Suffolk’s  was  1,493,000. See United States Census Bureau, State and County 
QuickFacts: Suffolk County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36103.html (last revised Jul. 08 
2014). 
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accused’s   first appearance in court.168 The attorney-client interviews 
“are  often  brief  because   there  are  so  many  defendants.”169 In spite of 
the   Supreme   Court’s   mandate   in   Rothgery170 that the arraignment 
stage requires the provision of effective counsel, the County stated that 
“at  least  half of the clients appear in Court without having previously 
spoken to the attorney who appears on their behalf   because…it   is  
physically impossible for the current [Legal Aid] Society staff, to 
interview all those requesting indigent representation.”171   
 
And even though the County made a request to the State for a 
modest increase in funding, Nassau was quite frank:  “[T]he  fact  is  that  
little can realistically be done to mitigate the harried and relatively 
chaotic situation” that existed in Arraignment Court.172 In an open 
acknowledgment that widespread constitutional violations were 
occurring,  the  County  stated  that  “we  are  left  to  try  to  ensure  adequate  
representation at first appearance as best as practicable.”173  
 
But to some extent, the best was saved for last. In a theme we 
have seen before,174 the County concluded its description of the 
conditions taking place in its Arraignment Courts   as   follows:   “In  
summary, while indigent defense lawyers may be physically present in 
the District Court at first appearance, their ability to provide adequate 
representation  is  severely  compromised.”175 The Constitution does not 
require that rights of citizens only be   respected   “as   best   as  
practicable.”   It   is   this   author’s   contention   that   we   tolerate   such  
constitutional  violations  occurring  because  we  just  don’t  care; after all, 
it is only the poor who are affected, and often minority to boot.176 
                                                 
168 Nassau County First Appearance Plan, Project Summary (Feb. 2013), at 2. 
169 Id. 
170 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213. 
171 Nassau County First Appearance Plan, supra note 168, at 2. For the last fifty 
years, the County has contracted with the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County and 
the Assigned Counsel Defender Plan to provide indigent defense services. Id. at 12. 
172 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
173 Id. (emphasis added). 
174 See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 224 (explaining that counsel may well 
be engaging not just in ineffective representation, but perhaps in non-representation). 
175 NASSAU COUNTY FIRST APPEARANCE PLAN, supra note 168, at 4. 
176 In 2012, approximately 43% of those incarcerated in Nassau County were 
African-American. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION OF CORRECTION, supra note 166. 
Only 12.4% of the general population was African-American. U.S. Census Bureau, 
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F. Mass Processing of Hispanic Defendants in Federal Court 
 
Staggering caseloads and inadequate resources directly impact 
minorities in the federal courts as well. The Ninth Circuit in 2013 in 
United States v. Arqueta Ramos,177 reviewed the actions by United 
States Magistrate Judges in Arizona who had conducted proceedings 
where there were pleas entered for up to 70 defendants at one time.178  
Operation Streamline is a program established by the Justice 
Department to require prosecution and imprisonment of all those who 
unlawfully cross the U.S./Mexico border; any possible use of 
discretion   by   the   U.S.   Attorneys’   offices   has been eliminated.179 A 
Magistrate Judge in the District Court typically presides over a hearing 
of 50-70 defendants at one time who are charged with the 
misdemeanor of illegal entry; guilty pleas and sentences all occur 
during this one proceeding.180 
 
This en masse handling of defendants makes a mockery of any 
concept we have of individualized justice. In the instance involving 
Arqueta-Ramos, the judge informed the group of sixty-three 
defendants  as  follows:  “I’m  going  to  start  by  addressing  all  of  you  as  a  
group, and then I will call you and your attorneys up five at a time to 
speak  to  you  more  individually  about  your  case.”181 While in the group 
of five, there was not any information given nor question asked of any 
defendant individually except whether or not he or she wished to enter 
a guilty plea.182  
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the failure of the Magistrate to ever 
individually ask the defendants whether they understood the charges 
against them or the consequences of pleading guilty, constituted a 
                                                                                                                   
State and County QuickFacts: Nassau County, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at  
http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36059.html (last revised Jul. 08 
2014). 
177 730 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). 
178 Id. at 1135–36. 
179 In re Approval of Judicial Emergency, 639 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2011). 
180 Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d at 1135–36 (citing United States v. Aguilar-Vera, 698 
F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012). 
181 Id. at 1136. 
182 Id. at 1137. 
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violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure183 and 
that the Government did not meet its burden of showing that such 
violation was harmless.184  The Court   emphasized   that,   “[w]e act 
within a system maintained by the rules of procedure. We cannot 
dispense with the rules without setting a precedent subversive of the 
structure.”185   
 
But the basic framework of Operation   Streamline’s mass 
processing of Hispanic defendants continues unabated. In February of 
2014,  Magistrate  Judge  Bernardo  Velasco  boasted  about  his  “record”  
time of 30 minutes to have had 25 defendants hear the charges against 
them, enter a plea, and receive their sentences.186  The Judge assured a 
New York Times reporter that there was no reason why we should be 
concerned:  “What  we  do   is  constitutional,   it   satisfies  due  process.      It  
may   not   look   good,   but   it   does   everything   the   law   requires.”187  
Indeed, the mass processing of   mostly   Mexican   men   with   “chains  
around  their  ankles  and  wrists  jingling  as  they  move,”  does  not  “look  
good.” 188 
 
G. Excessive Caseloads and the Contract System in California  
 
In 2004, the California State Senate created the California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice.189 The first charge 
of   the   Commission   was   “to   study   and   review   the   administration   of  
criminal justice in California to determine the extent to which that 
process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful executions or the 
wrongful   conviction   of   innocent   persons.”190 Four years later, the 
                                                 
183 Id. at  1139.  Rule  11  requires  the  court  to  “address  the  defendant  personally  in  
open court.”  FED.R.CRIM.P.11(b)(1). Furthermore, the Rule requires the court to 
inform a defendant of pre-trial  and  trial  rights  and  “determine  that  the  individual  
understands  those  rights.”  Id. 
184 Arqueta-Ramos, 730 F.3d at 1139–40. 
185 Id. at 1139 (quoting United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
186 Fernanda Santos, Detainees  Sentenced  in  Seconds  in  ‘Streamline’  Justice  on  
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2014, at A12. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 S. Res. 44, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). 
190 Id. 
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Final Report of the Commission found that every public defender 
office in the state except one reported problems with excessive 
attorney workloads.191 And the problems were not minor – over 81% 
of defenders reported the difficulties were significant, very significant, 
or serious.192 
 
But California presents a concern that this article has yet to 
analyze. Some counties in that state utilize the contract system for 
determining who is to represent indigents accused of crime; the lowest 
bidder – the group of attorneys that claims that they can represent the 
greatest number of defendants for the cheapest cost – wins the 
contract.  
 
The bidding procedure is the same as is commonly used for the 
awarding of contracts for the building of roads or sewers, or the 
removal of trash. In one such county, a contracted attorney reported 
that he pled 70% of his clients guilty at the very first court appearance 
after devoting all of 30 seconds to convey to each defendant the 
prosecutor’s  offer.193 Judges not only were complicit in the assembly-
line justice, but in the one instance where the contract attorney sought 
a continuance to prepare for trial on a felony charge because virtually 
no preparation or investigation had been done, the judge denied the 
request.194  
 
The Report recounts how one county chose to contract with a 
group of attorneys who had bid $16.8 million, successfully 
undercutting  a  competing  bid  of  $28  million  to  represent  the  county’s  
indigents who were accused of crime.195 A journalist described the 
defense   firm   as   following   a   “Wal-Mart   Business  Model,”196 and the 
                                                 
191 CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL 
REPORT 93 (Gerald Uelmen & Chris Boscoa eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/ccfajfinalreport.pdf. 
192 Id. Every  defender  office  that  responded  to  the  Commission’s  statewide survey 
reported excessive investigator caseloads.  Id. 
193 Id. at 95. 
194 Id. at 94 (citing SPANGENBERG GROUP, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SERVICE (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (2000)). 
195 Id. at 95. 
196 Id. (quoting Cheryl Miller, California Defense Firm Borrows Wal-Mart Business 
Model, THE RECORDER, Dec. 26, 2007). 
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owner  of   the  business   admitted   that  his   company  was   indeed   like   “a  
grocery  store.”197 Eighty-five lawyers in this public defender business 
were able to offer  counties  “rock-bottom  pricing”  due  to  the  utilization  
of  “a  revolving  door  of  undertrained  lawyers.”198 
 
In spite of the longstanding opposition of the ABA,199 the 
utilization of the low-bid contract system by a state to satisfy its 
constitutional obligations under Gideon and Argersinger is alive and 
well as governments have been strapped for cash in these post-
recession years. The major criticism is that since the contract typically 
takes the form of a lump-sum or fixed-fee arrangement, there is a 
disincentive for counsel to provide quality representation. It becomes 
financially desirable to process as many cases as possible and spend as 
little time as possible on any given case. Costs for expert witnesses or 
investigators typically come out of the pockets – and therefore profits 
– of the attorneys.   
 
The Report of the California Commission recommended that 
the State impose minimal standards on any contracting defenders, as is 
done for county contracts for public works, and that all such contracts 
provide separate funding for investigators and expert witnesses.200  
The ABA itself in 2002 went on record asserting that any contract for 
defense services should separately fund expert, investigative, and other 
litigation support services.201 
                                                 
197 Cheryl Miller, Market Force, THE RECORDER, Dec. 20, 2007. 
198 Id. 
199 The first Resolution relating to the matter of contracting out defender services 
was  in  February  1985;;  the  ABA  resolved  that  it  “opposes  the  awarding  of  public  
defense contracts on the basis of cost alone, or through competitive bidding without 
reference to  quality  of  representation.”  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SECTION STANDING COMMISSION ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
REPORT OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1985), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/scla
id/20110325_aba_110.authcheckdam.pdf. Six months later, the ABA resolved that 
any contract entered into needed to comply with both Chapter 5 (Providing Defense 
Services) of the ABA  Standards  of  Criminal  Justice  as  well  as  the  NLADA’s  
Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Governmental Contracts for Criminal 
Defense Services.   
200 CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 
191, at 96. 
201 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA 
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H. Race, the Missouri Supreme Court, and Overburdened 
Public Defenders 
 
In Missouri, the percentage of African-Americans who are 
arrested is more than 4 times higher than the percentage of whites in 
the general population.202 And, as one would expect, there is a crisis 
relating to funding for counsel to represent the indigent poor. The 
statewide Public Defender Commission responded to the concern 
about the excessive caseloads of defenders by promulgating a Rule 
requiring local defender offices to set the maximum caseloads that the 
office is able to handle in order for the workload not to interfere with 
the ability to properly represent clients.203  After reaching its 
maximum caseloads for a three-month consecutive period, an office is 
then able to inform the presiding district judge that it will not, and 
cannot, accept additional cases.204 
                                                                                                                   
TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_def
endants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
202 Howard Koplowitz, Ferguson Missouri Crime Stats 2014: Blacks Arrested 4 
Times As Much As Whites, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014, 3:39 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/ferguson-missouri-crime-stats-2014-blacks-arrested-4-
times-much-whites-1658846. 
203 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 18, § 10-4.010(1)(A) (2014). The American Council of 
Chief Defenders has issued a supportive policy statement: 
 
A chief executive of an agency providing public defense services is 
ethically prohibited from accepting a number of cases which 
exceeds   the   capacity   of   the   agency’s   attorneys   to   provide  
competent,   quality   representation   in   every   case….When 
confronted with a prospective overloading of cases or reductions in 
funding   or   staffing   which   will   cause   the   agency’s   attorneys   to  
exceed such capacity, the chief executive of a public defense 
agency is ethically required to refuse appointment to any and all 
such excess cases. 
 
American Council of Chief Defenders, Ethics Opinion 03-01, NAT’L LEGAL AID & 
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 1 (Apr. 2013), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1082573112.32/ACCD%20Ethics%20opini
on%20on%20Workloads.pdf. 
204 MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 18, § 10-4.010(2)(A) (2014). The Missouri Supreme 
Court explained that the purpose of the Rule was to assist prosecutors and judges as 
well as defense counsel to fulfill their obligation to ensure that excessive caseloads 
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There was an overwhelming increase in cases during the six-
year period of 2006-2012 in the 38th Circuit in Southwest Missouri.205  
The state public defender office informed Presiding Judge Mark Orr 
that its caseload maximums had been exceeded and that it was unable 
to accept any new cases.206 Judge Orr, nevertheless, appointed a public 
defender to a new case after meetings with the prosecutors and public 
defender office failed to reach any agreement to limit caseloads.207  
The defenders obtained a preliminary writ from the Missouri Supreme 
Court prohibiting the Judge from taking any action on the new case 
which had been assigned to the defender office.208 The Court also 
appointed a Special Master to assess the situation.209   
 
The   Missouri   Supreme   Court’s   final   opinion   in   this   case   in  
2012 is a noteworthy and highly significant one for its steadfast 
support of the   Sixth   Amendment’s   requirements   for   effective  
assistance.210 The Court emphasized that it is the obligation and the 
professional  responsibility  of  defense  counsel,  “not  to  accept  work  that  
counsel  does  not  believe  he  or  she  can  perform  competently.”211 What 
seems to be an obvious truth, but one which is often conveniently 
overlooked,  was  stated  emphatically  by  the  Court:  “Effective,  not just 
pro forma, representation is required by the Missouri and federal 
constitutions.”212  
 
                                                                                                                   
would not inhibit effective representation.  State  ex  rel.  Mo.  Pub.  Defender  Comm’n  
v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Mo. 2012). 
205 State ex rel. Missouri Public Defenders Commisison v. Waters [1], MO. L. REV. 
(July 31, 2012), available at http://missourilawreview.blogspot.com/2012/07/state-
ex-rel-missouri-public-defenders.html. See also Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, 
Bolstered by a Work Analysis and Rulings, Push Back Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/us/public-defenders-
turn-to-lawmakers-to-try-to-ease-caseloads.html?_r=0 
206 Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 600–01. 
207 Id.  
208 Id. at 601. 
209 Id. at 601–02. 
210 The  Missouri  Constitution  itself  provides  that,  “in  criminal  prosecutions  the  
accused  shall  have  the  right  to  appear  and  defend,  in  person  and  by  counsel.”  MO. 
CONST. art I, § 18(a). 
211 Waters, 370 S.W.3d at 607. 
212 Id. (emphasis added). 
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But the most significant impact of this case is the warning that 
the   state’s   highest   court   imparted   to   the   lower   level   trial   courts:    
“Simply  put,  a  judge  may  not  appoint  counsel  when  the  judge  is  aware  
that, for whatever reason, counsel is unable to provide effective 
representation  to  a  defendant.”213 
 
V. ACTUAL HARM TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 
 
A. The Crucial Import of Case Preparation 
 
 What are the precise ways that indigent defendants suffer when 
their advocates carry excessive caseloads? First and foremost, their 
cases are not adequately investigated and prepared. Effective advocacy 
requires extensive preparation – both factual and legal. The police 
officer’s   description   of   the   crime will remain unchallenged if the 
lawyer has not sought out witnesses, researched the applicable law, or 
investigated the existence of any valid defense. Communications from 
one’s  client  may  be  crucial  in building a defense, yet the overburdened 
counsel simply may not have the time to travel to and visit the jail 
where the defendant is held. Defenders must pick and choose which 
few cases to devote time and resources to. In the medical world, this is 
referred to as triage.214 
 
 A comprehensive case preparation entails investigating the 
facts relating to the criminal charge: visiting the scene of the crime, 
accessing and examining key pieces of evidence, and locating both the 
prosecution and possible defense witnesses.215 It is frequently 
                                                 
213 Id.   
214 In fact, the Florida Supreme Court characterized the Miami-Dade County Public 
Defender Office as engaging in triage, where the clients who face the most serious 
charges have priority at the expense of other clients. Pub. Defender, Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013). See also In re Order on 
Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d  1130,  1135  (Fla.  1990)  (“When 
excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the 
various indigent criminal defendants he represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably 
created.”). 
215 See PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 4.1 
(Nat’l  Legal  Aid  &  Defender  Ass’n 1995), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#fouro
ne  (last  visited  Sept.  20,  2014)  (noting  that  counsel’s  investigation  should  occur  as  
promptly as possible with the following as possible sources:  the charging 
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necessary to consult with experts to receive their guidance – and 
maybe to prepare their testimony.216 As the Third Circuit observed in 
Moore v. United States, adequate trial preparation may well be more 
critical to success than the forensic skill demonstrated in court.217   
 
A Commentary in the ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
elaborates on the extreme import of counsel’s obligation: 
 
Experienced trial counsel know that effectiveness at 
trial depends upon meticulous evaluation and 
preparation of the evidence to be presented. Where 
counsel’s  evaluation  and  preparation  are  hampered  by  a  
lack of information, the trial becomes a pursuit of truth 
and justice more by chance than by design. This can 
only lead to a diminished respect for the criminal 
justice system, the judiciary, and the attorneys who 
participate.218 
 
Surely, no investigation can be comprehensive without consultation 
with the client.219 The Supreme Court has long held that due process 
requires that defendants have the opportunity to consult with their 
                                                                                                                   
documents, the accused, potential witnesses, the police and prosecution by way of 
informal as well as formal discovery, the scene of the crime, and the possible 
assistance of experts). See also id. (providing, in Guideline 4.2, that  counsel’s  
discovery should include seeking the names and addresses of all prosecution 
witnesses). 
216 A successful cross-examination of prosecution experts can often depend on 
defense  counsel’s  consulting  with  his  own  experts.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (noting the import of an effective confrontation of the 
state’s  experts  when  defense  counsel  confronted  those  who  had  prepared  the  reports  
of the laboratory certificates regarding the composition and weight of the alleged 
cocaine). 
217 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970). 
218 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 11-1.1 
cmt. 11-1.1(a) (3d ed. 1996). 
219 The investigation needs to be done before plea negotiations commence. For an 
elaboration of the critical import  of  counsel’s  consultation  with  his  client, see 
Michael D. Dean & Rick McKelvey, The Basics of Plea Negotiation: A Dual 
Perspective, 28 CRIM. JUST. 52, 52–53 (2013). See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.2 (“[D]efense counsel should seek to 
determine  all  relevant  facts  known  to  the  accused.”). 
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counsel.220 But in recent years, courts have indicated that even this 
very basic expectation of competent lawyering has been sacrificed at 
the altar of processing cases.  
 
B. The Failure of the New Jersey Supreme Court to Protect 
Indigents’  Right  to  Counsel 
 
 Take, for instance, the 2013 holding of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in State v. Miller.221 In that case, the defendant was indicted on 
8 counts relating to drug possession with intent to distribute.222 The 
initial public defender assigned to represent the defendant was 
removed from the case by the Office of the Public Defender and the 
substitute defender had never met or had any contact with the 
defendant until the day of trial.223 Before the actual appearance in 
court, the lawyer conferred with his client for less than an hour in an 
empty stairwell between two floors in the courthouse building; counsel 
described that location as “the  only  private  area”  available.224   
  
 When the case was called by the judge at 10:30, counsel 
requested an adjournment stating that the defendant “would best 
prefer…an opportunity for us to sit in a more – in a calmer setting so 
that we can discuss and plan this particular matter.”225 Counsel made it 
clear to the judge that that morning was the first opportunity he had to 
meet with his client.226 The ABA Criminal Justice Standards are clear 
in requiring every jurisdiction to guarantee the right of an accused 
person to prompt and effective communication with a lawyer.227  The 
                                                 
220 See, e.g., Hawk v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271, 278 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 
U.S. 485, 489 (1945) (noting it is necessary that counsel provide knowledgeable and 
informed advice in order to overcome the ignorance or bewilderment of the client). 
221 76 A.3d 1250 (N.J. 2013). 
222 Id. at 1255. 
223 Id. at 1255–56.  
224 Id. at 1256. Courts have historically emphasized that conversations between 
counsel and his client need to be done in a private setting. See, e.g., In re Mandell, 
69 F.2d. 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1934) (noting that the relationship between a lawyer and 
an  accused  is    “highly confidential . . . in order that they might work together 
harmoniously”). 
225 Id. at 1270.  
226 State v. Miller, 18 A.3d 1054, 1067 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
227 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-2.1 (3d ed. 1993). See 
also PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 
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ABA’s  Ten  Principles  of  a  Public  Defense Delivery System requires 
that   “defense   counsel   is   provided   sufficient   time   and   a   confidential  
space within which to meet with the client.”228   
 
 The  judge  refused  to  grant  an  adjournment,  stating  that  “trying  
a drug case for a criminal defense attorney is as easy as trying an 
intersection accident case for a civil lawyer….   [T]he scenarios are 
essentially the same in every case.”229 Proceedings commenced 
immediately with a suppression motion whereby the defendant 
maintained that there had not been probable cause for his arrest and 
that currency found on his person should therefore be suppressed.230  
Even though the defendant had just met counsel that morning and 
there was little time to discuss any possible testimony, the defendant 
did take the stand.231 The motion was denied and jury selection began 
the following morning.232 The defendant was convicted and sentenced 
to a prison term of five years.233 
 
 Surely, we have the right to expect more from the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey than the justice offered to Terrence Miller.234 
                                                                                                                   
2.2(b)(1) (Nat’l  Legal  Aid  &  Defender  Ass’n 1995) (providing that counsel should 
ensure that barriers to communication be overcome). Surely, meeting in a stairwell 
would be considered such a barrier. 
228 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra 
note 201, at 2. The  Commentary  to  Principle  4  elaborates:    “Counsel  should  have  
confidential access to the client for the full exchange of legal, procedural, and factual 
information between counsel and client. To ensure confidential communications, 
private meeting space should be available in jails, prisons, courthouses, and other 
places  where  defendants  must  confer  with  counsel.”  Id. 
229 Miller, 76 A.3d at 1271. 
230 Id. at 1256. 
231 Id. Miller stated that he had witnesses who would corroborate his account of what 
happened  but  “for  some  reason,  we  weren’t  prepared  for  the  day.”  Id. at 1272. The 
Supreme  Court  has  held  that  defense  counsel  does  have  “a  duty  to  discuss  potential  
strategies  with  the  defendant.”  Florida  v.  Nixon,  543  U.S.  175,  178  (2004)  (citing  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
232 Miller, 76 A.3d at 1257. 
233 Miller, 18 A.3d at 1060. The defendant was convicted on all five counts for 
which he was tried. Id. 
234 There certainly had been language from the Court that would have been cause for 
optimism. See, e.g., State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474, 483 (N.J. 1980) (noting that a 
defendant’s  lawyer  must  have  “the  absolute  trust  and  confidence  of  his  client,  since  
an effective defense will follow only when a defendant has made full and frank 
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After all, how could the answer be anything other than in the 
affirmative to the question posed for consideration on appeal: “Did  the  
denial of defense counsel’s   adjournment request require a new trial 
because defendant, through no fault of his own, was assigned a new 
attorney who he did not meet until the scheduled trial date?”235  
 
And yet,  a  “No,”  was  what  came from the Appellate Division.  
Not to worry, was  the  Court’s  message.  In  a  blatant  rationalization  of  
what had transpired, the Court strained credibility: “The attorney that 
the defendant first meets the morning of a hearing or trial may perform 
more effectively in his defense than the attorney who has developed a 
good relationship with the defendant but is inadequately prepared, 
lacks experience to devise good strategy, or simply makes poor 
decisions.”236 Is the benchmark – the standard to be used to judge an 
indigent’s   counsel – the inadequately prepared and inexperienced 
lawyer who makes poor decisions? Is it too much to hope that Gideon 
would be understood as demanding that counsel be prepared and also 
that counsel does not meet client for the first time on the day of trial? 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s 
failure   to   grant   the   requested   continuance   “offended   neither  
constitutional norms nor principles of fundamental fairness.”237   
 
Whereas state courts are free to provide more protections to a 
defendant than is provided under Strickland,238 New Jersey has 
adopted the Strickland standard as the benchmark to measure whether 
the right to counsel has been violated under the New Jersey 
                                                                                                                   
disclosure  of  his  knowledge  of  events  surrounding  the  alleged  crime”). Miller hardly 
had any opportunity to disclose anything to his counsel. Miller, 76 A.3d at 1256. 
235 Appeals Added in the New Jersey Supreme Court, NEW JERSEY COURTS, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/calendars/sc_appeal.htm (last updated Sept. 12, 
2014). 
236 Miller, 18 A.3d at 1065. 
237 Miller, 76 A.3d at 1254. 
238 See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 849 (N.J. 1987) (noting that the 
rights afforded under the state constitution have often been interpreted to provide 
broader protections than those provided for under the federal constitution). See also 
State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 407 (N.J. 1992) (recognizing that the right of an 
indigent to have appointed counsel existed in New Jersey before any other state in 
the country (citing State v. Horton, 170 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1961))). 
Klein    
208  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:2 
 
 
Constitution.239 Yet even a Strickland analysis might well find the 
situation presented in Miller to be unacceptable. The U.S. Supreme 
Court had noted  that,  “[i]n  every  case the [appellate] court should be 
concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, 
the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a 
breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to 
produce  just  results.”240 One might well conclude that when a defense 
lawyer has not had time to discuss the case with their client, then the 
adversarial process has broken down. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court did acknowledge that Miller 
wished to have the Public Defender who had earlier worked on his 
case continue the representation, yet the Court was clear in its 
distinction of rights afforded the indigents who get appointed counsel 
from those with funds to privately retain counsel.241 The Sixth 
Amendment is being applied differently depending on the wealth of 
the defendant, surely such a two-tiered system of justice cannot be 
what  is  meant  by  “Equal  Justice  Under  Law.”242 
 
 The Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama,243 recognized that 
for those with the requisite funds,   the  Sixth  Amendment  provides   “a  
fair opportunity to secure counsel of [one’s] own choice.”244 But 
seventy four years later, the Court determined that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a counsel of  one’s  choosing, “does  not  extend  to  
defendants who require counsel to be appointed for   them.”245 It is 
                                                 
239 State v. Fritz, 519 A.2d. 336, 345 (N.J. 1987). As to the requirement that 
prejudice must be shown, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has determined that 
prejudice is to be presumed in instances where the defendant has been coerced into 
effectively proceeding without counsel. See State v. Hayes, 16 A.3d 1028, 1039 
(2011). See also State v. Bellucci, 410 A.2d 666, 672 (1980) (stating that prejudice 
should be presumed in instances where a requirement of prejudice would put an 
impossible burden on the defendant forcing the appellate court to partake in 
unbridled speculation (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978))). 
240 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
241 Miller, 18 A.3d at 1066. 
242 The  phrase  “Equal  Justice  Under  Law”  is  engraved  on  the  front  of  the  U.S.  
Supreme Court building in Washington. 
243 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
244 Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
245 United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006) (emphasis added). It 
is hard to reconcile such a determination by the Court with  Justice  Brennan’s  
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most difficult to maintain that our system of defense representation 
does not violate the call issued by Justice Hugo Black announcing the 
judgment of the Court in Griffin v. Illinois:246 “There  can  be  no  equal  
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of 
money  he  has.”247  
 
In   Terrence   Miller’s case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
totally dismissed the defendant’s concerns about the substitution of his 
counsel by the Office of the Public Defender just days before trial.248 
The new counsel had been working on a per diem basis for the Office 
handling strictly juvenile cases, and had not tried a criminal case in the 
previous seven years.249 The Office itself had failed to request an 
adjournment for the case upon the change of counsel even though the 
substitute counsel  acknowledged  that  he  “was  being  put in a position 
that  [he]  shouldn’t  be  in.”250  
 
The trial court’s determination that moving the calendar 
forward was the highest priority was not faulted by the state Supreme 
Court; after all, as the trial judge put it, the matter was a simple drug 
prosecution  involving  “nothing  difficult  or  complex.”251 On the other 
hand, Miller may well have found the ten-year sentence he was facing 
to be difficult indeed. The defendant really did seem to be considered 
a faceless, fungible individual taking his turn on the assembly line.  
And  his  turn  didn’t  even  require  establishing  any  relationship  with  his  
counsel.252   
                                                                                                                   
opinion that, “[n]othing about indigent defendants makes their relationships with 
their attorneys less important, or less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy 
defendants.”  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). If an 
indigent is stuck with an attorney who is not providing competent representation 
there will be no recourse. 
246 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
247 Id. at 19. 
248 State v. Miller, 76 A.3d. 1250, 1268 (N.J. 2013). 
249 Id. at 1269 (Albin, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 1256. In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically noted that the 
complexity  of  a  case  was  a  factor  to  be  used  when  assessing  a  trial  court’s  refusal  to  
grant  a  defendant’s  request  for  an  adjournment.  State v. Hayes, 16 A.3d 1028, 1037–
38 (2011) (citing United States v. Burton, F. 2d 485, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
252 Miller, 76 A.3d at 1268 (acknowledging that the hurried meeting that counsel had 
with his client in the stairwell shortly before the commencement of the suppression 
motion  was  “conducted  in  a  less than optimal location . . .”). 
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One could certainly think that the Court had overlooked and 
ignored its earlier declaration in Doe v. Poritz253 that fundamental 
fairness “serves   to   protect   citizens generally against unjust and 
arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental 
procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.254 [It] serves, depending on 
the context, as an augmentation of existing constitutional protection or 
as  an  independent  source  of  protection  against  state  action.”255 
 
 However shocking to the conscience the Miller holding was, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court was accurate in its determination that 
there  is  “no  federal  constitutional right to a ‘meaningful  relationship’  
between a criminal defendant and his or her attorney.”256 In Morris v. 
Slappy, the defendant had sought an adjournment of his trial until his 
counsel recuperated from emergency surgery.257 The Sixth Circuit 
reversed the conviction that resulted after the trial court judge denied 
the requested continuance, but then the Supreme Court reversed again 
with   a   stunning   declaration:   “We   reject   the   claim that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a   ‘meaningful relationship’   between   an  
accused  and  his  counsel.”258  
 
In some ways, one can’t help but wonder if we have gone 
backwards from the recognition in Powell v. Alabama in 1932, when 
the Supreme Court recognized that   “a defendant, charged with a 
serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time 
to advise with counsel and prepare his defense.”259 It is only through 
time that a relationship of trust and confidence can be established by 
                                                 
253 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). 
254 Id. at 421 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 377 (1987) (Handler, J., 
dissenting)). 
255 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court had actually used even stronger language 
when  it  declared  that,  “[b]ecause our concern for judicial integrity extends to even its 
mere appearance, we have employed the notion of fundamental fairness to strike 
down official action that does not itself  violate  due  process  of  law.”  State v. Sugar, 
417 A.2d 474, 481 (N.J. 1980). 
256 Miller, 76 A.3d. at 1264. 
257 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1983). 
258 Id. at 13–14. 
259 Powell, 287 U.S. at 59. 
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counsel with their client; fundamental fairness and due process require 
nothing less. 
 
VI. RACE, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
  
A. Overview 
 
Nowhere is the racial imbalance in our justice system more 
closely connected with inadequate representation of counsel than with 
this   country’s   use   of   the   death   penalty.   It   is   indisputable   that   the  
impact of the penalty has been far greater for African-American than 
for Whites. When the Supreme Court halted executions in this country 
with its decision in Furman v. Georgia, a primary focus was the 
violation of equal protection which had resulted from the imposition of 
the  death  penalty.   In   Justice  Marshall’s  concurring opinion, he noted 
the statistic that in the years from 1930-1972, 1,751 Whites had been 
executed compared to 2,066 African Americans.260 Marshall 
concluded   that   “[i]t is immediately apparent that Negroes were 
executed far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage 
of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of 
execution of Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is 
evidence  of  racial  discrimination.”261 
 
But after Furman’s   finding that the Georgia death penalty 
statute had been imposed in an arbitrary manner in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, states rushed to enact new statutes. Just four years 
after Furman, the Court found that a newly revised statute dealt with 
the concerns that had been expressed and would, therefore, be 
constitutional. The Georgia statute approved in Gregg v. Georgia 
listed ten aggravating factors which were to be used and weighed by 
                                                 
260 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
261 Id. at 364. Justice Stewart determined, after a discussion of the arbitrariness of the 
imposition  of  the  death  penalty,  that  “if  any  basis  can  be  discerned  for  the  selection  
of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of 
race.” Id.  at  310.  Justice  Douglas  found  death  penalty  statutes  to  be  “pregnant  with  
discrimination”  and  therefore  in  violation  of  the  equal  protection  guarantee  that  is  
implicit in the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 257. 
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jurors to enable more reasoned determinations as to who would 
receive the sentence of death.262  
 
Ten states had enacted statutes making the death penalty 
mandatory for certain offenses in order to eliminate any arbitrariness, 
but the Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina found such 
statutes to be unconstitutional.263 Two years later, the Court in Lockett 
v. Ohio required that death penalty statutes allow for the consideration 
of mitigating factors that related either to the defendant or to the crime 
which was committed.264 The Court emphasized the historical import 
of the concept of individualized sentencing265 which, by its very 
nature, was violated by a mandatory sentence of death such as that 
which existed in Ohio for the crime of aggravated murder. 
 
In its continued specification as to what was required for a 
death sentence to be constitutional after Furman, the Court found that 
a death sentence for an individual who did not possess the intention to 
kill was in violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment;266 the execution of someone who was insane 
and not cognizant of the reasons why he would be executed, was 
prohibited;267 the death sentence for a person who was mentally 
retarded would be cruel and unusual punishment;268 counsel was 
                                                 
262 428 U.S. 153, 164–65 (1976). The Georgia statute required that the jurors find the 
presence of at least one of the ten aggravating factors enumerated in the statute 
before death could be imposed. Aggravating circumstances included a prior capital 
felony conviction, a contract murder-for-hire, committing the murder concurrently 
with  another  specified  felony,  or  the  commission  of  the  murder  in  an  “outrageously  
or  wantonly  vile,  horrible,  or  inhuman”  manner.    Id. at 201. 
263 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The North Carolina statute 
had made the death penalty mandatory for the crime of first degree murder; the 
Court held that the mandate was in violation of the requirement of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments that  punishments  adhere  to  “evolving  standards of 
decency”  and  be  “exercised  within  the  limits  of  civilized  standards.”  Id. at 301. 
264 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
265 Id. at 602–03. The Court was clear that the emphasis on individualized sentences 
does not arise from any constitutional requirement, but rather on public policy, 
which has been enacted, into statutes.  Id. at 604–05. 
266 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
267 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417–18 (1986). 
268 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Atkins reversed the prior holding in 
Penry v. Lynaugh, which found that it was not in violation of the Constitution to 
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required by the Sixth Amendment to conduct an investigation of 
possible mitigating factors;269 the Constitution prohibited anyone who 
was less than 18 years old at the time of the murder, to be sentenced to 
death;270 the three-drug protocol used in lethal injections was not cruel 
and unusual punishment271; and, it constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment to impose a death sentence for the crime of rape of an 
adult,272 or of a child.273 
 
B. Failure of the Supreme Court to Respond to Racial 
Disparities 
 
But it was McCleskey v. Kemp that brought the issue of race 
directly  to  the  Court’s  front  door. 274 A jury of eleven Whites and one 
African-American sentenced Warren McCleskey to death for the 
murder of a White man.275 In one of the most bitterly received 
Supreme Court holdings,276 the Court concluded that even though the 
                                                                                                                   
execute a retarded person. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
269 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003). 
270 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Roper reversed the prior 
holding in Sanford v. Kentucky permitting the execution of 16 and 17 year olds. 492 
U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
271 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 63 (2008). 
272 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977). 
273 Louisiana had maintained that although the Coker Court had concluded that it 
constituted an excessive punishment to sentence someone to death for the rape of an 
adult, the harm caused by the rape of a child was far greater and warranted a 
sentence of death. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 418–19, 446 (2008). 
274 481 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1987). 
275 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 346 & 377 n. 15 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
276 See Cassandra Stubbs, The Dred Scott of Our Time, ACLU (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:09 
AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/capital-punishment/dred-scott-our-time 
(“McCleskey has been roundly condemned as a low point  in  the  quest  for  equality.”). 
See also Eva Patterson & Christina Swarms, 25 Years Later, McCleskey Decision 
still Fosters Racism by Ignoring It, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Apr. 19, 2102), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/25-years-later-mccleskey-decision-still-fosters-
racism-by-ignoring-it. Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional Faith, 
McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5, 5 
(2012) (noting McCleskey is firmly entrenched in the book of Notorious Cases in 
which the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the Constitution’s  most  basic  
values). Case: Landmark: McCleskey v. Kemp, NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. 
FUND (Apr. 27, 1987), http://www.naacpldf.org/case/mccleskey-v-kemp (stating that 
McCleskey acts as a barrier to the elimination of racial inequalities in the criminal 
justice system). 
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statistical evidence before the Court was not disputed in its illustration 
of the glaring racial disparities resulting from the imposition of the 
death penalty,277 neither the Eighth nor the Fourteenth Amendments 
were violated by the Georgia death penalty statute.278  
 
McCleskey presented the Court with an unchallenged, 
sophisticated multiple-regression statistical analysis of over 2,000 
murder cases that had occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.279 The 
cases were divided as to the race of the defendant as well as the 
victim; yet, an African-American defendant who killed a White victim 
was more than 7 times more likely to have received the death penalty 
than when a White defendant had killed an African-American 
victim.280 Furthermore, African-Americans who kill Whites are 
sentenced to death nearly 22 times more often than when an African-
American kills another African-American.281  
 
Georgia certainly was no stranger to racial distinctions in its 
criminal laws. Prior to the Civil War, the sentence for an African-
American who raped a White woman would be a mandatory penalty of 
death, yet a White man committing the same crime would face a 
prison term between 2 and 20 years.282 And if an African-American 
woman were to be raped, the sentencing court would have discretion 
in setting a fine and term of imprisonment.283  
 
                                                 
277 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had conceded that the statistical study 
engaged  in  on  McCleskey’s  behalf  demonstrated  that  “there  is  a  race-of-the-victim 
relationship with the imposition of the death sentence discernible in enough cases to 
be statistically significant in  the  system  as  a  whole.”  McCleskey  v.  Kemp,  753  F.2d  
877, 897 (11th Cir. 1985). The Court further concluded that the statistics did show 
that systematic and substantial disparities existed in the penalties imposed upon 
homicide defendants in Georgia based on the race of the homicide victim. Id. at 895–
96. 
278 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291–92, 308. 
279 Id. at 286. 
280 Id. (finding that in 22% of the cases involving an African-American defendant 
and a White victim, the defendant received the death penalty, yet in only 3% of the 
cases where the defendant was White and the victim was African-American, was 
such a sentence imposed). 
281 Id. at 327 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
282 See id. at 329–330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Ga. Penal Code (1861)). 
283 Id. at 330. 
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The decision of the McCleskey court was 5-4.284 The Court 
emphasized that for a claim of an equal protection violation to prevail, 
it must be shown that there was purposeful discrimination; mere 
disparate impact would not be sufficient.285 McCleskey had claimed 
that he was denied his rights under the Equal Protection Clause 
because the race-of-victim discrimination increased the likelihood of 
his getting a sentence of death.286 But the Court required that 
McCleskey show that racial considerations in his specific case 
determined the sentence.287  
 
The Court did not elaborate on just how that could be shown; 
surely no prosecutor will state that he sought the death penalty because 
he regarded – consciously or otherwise – the killing of a White by an 
African-American to be the type of a murder which requires the 
defendant be put to death.288 Can one possibly think that jurors would, 
in a post-conviction proceeding, tell a court that they only voted it 
impose the death sentence because McCleskey was an African-
American man who shot a White? 
. 
The McCleskey Court missed a huge opportunity to issue a 
landmark decision requiring states to enact reforms to remedy the 
disproportionate impact that our criminal justice system has on 
African-Americans. And the Court knew it.289 In what Justice Brennan 
                                                 
284 Id. at 330. 
285 Id. at 292–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding that it is immaterial whether or 
not the impermissible influence of race is intentional). The Eighth Amendment 
requires  that  punishment  “comports  with  social  standards  of  rationality  and  
decency.”    Id. at 345, n. 1. 
286 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 347 (1984). 
287 Id. 
288 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, emphasized how important it in fact was for 
there to be discretion in any system providing for capital punishment and that 
prosecutorial decision-making by necessity involved both factual and judgmental 
decisions, which vary from case to case. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n. 37. 
289 The  Court  stated  that  the  4  dissenting  Justices’  reliance  on  the  statistical  showing  
in  this  case  “questions  the  very  heart  of  our  criminal  justice system: the traditional 
discretion  that  prosecutors  and  juries  must  have.”  Id. at 313, n. 37. The statistical 
evidence indicated that at every stage in the process, from the indictment of the 
defendant through sentencing, that the White-victim cases had a higher likelihood of 
remaining in the system and resulting in a sentence of death.  See id. at 356 n.11 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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characterized   in   his   dissent   as   a   “fear   of   too   much   justice,”290 the 
opinion of the Court fully acknowledged the potential impact of the 
statistical data compiled in this matter: 
 
McCleskey’s   claim,   taken   to   its   logical   conclusion  
throws into serious question the principles that underlie 
our entire criminal justice system. The Eighth 
Amendment is not limited in application to capital 
punishment, but   applies   to   all   penalties….  Thus if we 
accepted   McCleskey’s   claim   that   racial   bias   has  
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, 
we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other 
types of penalty.  Moreover, the claim that his sentence 
rests on the irrelevant factor of race could be extended 
to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies 
that correlate to membership in other minority groups, 
and even to gender.291   
 
The Court was not hesitant to express its fear when it noted that, 
“studies   already   exist   that   allegedly   demonstrate   a   racial   disparity   in  
the  length  of  prison  sentences.”292 
 
The Court chose not to descend down the slippery slope toward 
too much justice. And our justice system, especially with regard to the 
death penalty, has paid the price. Warren McCleskey did as well – he 
was executed on September 26, 1991.293 As of January 2014, the 
proportion of African-Americans on Death Row was more than 3 
times the overall percentage of the U.S. population that is African-
American.294 In the years from 1976, when Furman295 reinstated the 
                                                 
290 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
291 Id. at 314–317 (majority opinion). The Court  added  that  McCleskey’s  claims  are  
better dealt with by state legislatures. Id. at 319. 
292 Id. at 315, n. 38. 
293 Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate is Executed After Chaotic Legal Move, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/26/us/georgia-
inmate-is-executed-after-chaotic-legal-move.html. 
294 Death Penalty Information Center, National Statistics on the Death Penalty and 
Race, DIPC, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-
1976 (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). About 41% of those on death row are African-
American. Id. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2013, 13.2% of the 
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death penalty, until 2014, 266 African-Americans have been executed 
for the murder of a White person whereas only 20 Whites have been 
put to death for the killing of an African-American.296   
 
C. Inadequate Funding for Counsel in Capital Cases 
 
Meanwhile, the funding for the competent lawyering that is 
especially required in capital cases has been inadequate. The American 
Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review Project issued a 
Report in 2013 on the State of the Modern Death Penalty in 
America.297 This Report found death penalty processes across the 
various states to be: 
 
[U]ndermined most significantly by ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In the majority of states assessed, 
unqualified and under-compensated lawyers without 
resources needed to adequately and effectively defend a 
capital case, are often appointed to represent people 
facing   the   death   penalty…a   number   of   irreparable  
consequences flow from states’   assignment   of   ill-
equipped, poorly trained, and poorly compensated 
counsel to death penalty cases.298 
 
                                                                                                                   
population was African-American. The U.S. Census Bureau, USA Quickfacts, US 
CENSUS BUREAU (July 8, 2014, 6:37 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. 
295 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
296 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 294, at 1. 
297 American Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, The State 
of the Modern Death Penalty in America: Key Findings of State Death Penalty 
Assessments 2006-2013, ABA, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratori
um/aba_state_of_modern_death_penalty_web_file.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2014). The Due Process Review Project was instituted in 2001 to 
implement a process of assessing the fairness of the death penalty proceedings at the 
state level. Id. Each assessment report devotes a chapter to the following areas: (1) 
an overview of the particular  state’s  death  penalty  procedures;;  (2) the investigations 
and interrogations conducted by law enforcement; (3) collecting and preserving of 
evidence; (4) crime laboratories and medical examiner offices; (5) prosecution; (6) 
defense services; (7) appeal process; (8) state habeas corpus proceedings; (9) 
clemency; (10) jury instructions; (11) judicial independence and vigilance; (12) 
treatment of minorities; and, (13) mental retardation. Id. at 4. 
298 Id. at 5. 
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The concerns of the ABA regarding fairness and effective counsel for 
racial minorities in death penalty cases have been longstanding. In 
1979, the ABA adopted a policy calling for increased competency for 
counsel in capital matters;299 in 1983, the ABA passed a resolution 
calling for the end of the death penalty for juveniles;300 In 1988, a year 
after McCleskey,301 the ABA called for the elimination of racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing;302 the ABA in 1989 supported 
prohibition of the execution of the mentally retarded,303 13 years 
before the Supreme Court did so in Atkins v. Virginia;304 and, the 
Association confronted the problem directly by the issuance in 2003 of 
the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.305 
 
 Perhaps the strongest statement of the ABA regarding the 
intersection of race and ineffective assistance of counsel in death 
penalty cases is the policy adopted by the House of Delegates calling 
for a moratorium on executions.306 The Report accompanying the 
adopted   Resolution   explained   that   “fundamental   due   process   is   now  
systematically  lacking  in  capital  cases”  and  that   the  administration  of  
the death  penalty  is  “seriously  flawed.”307 Appointed counsel in capital 
                                                 
299 Id. at 1. 
300 Id.  
301 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
302 American Bar Association Death Penalty Due Process Review Project, supra note 
297. 
303 Id.  
304 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
305 American Bar Association, American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 
HOFSTRA L.REV. 913 (2003). The black-letter text of the guidelines has been 
approved by the ABA as official policy; the accompanying commentary is designed 
to serve as useful explanations of the guidelines while not representing the formal 
position of the ABA. Id. at 916. 
306 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 
RECOMMENDATION (Feb. 1997), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/scla
id/20110325_aba_107.authcheckdam.pdf. See also, ABA Calls For Moratorium on 
Executions Until Death Penalty Fairness Assured, PBS ONLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/procon/aba.html (last visited Sept. 
12, 2014). 
307 Id. 
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cases   were   found   to   be   “grossly   unqualified   and   undercompensated  
lawyers who have nothing like the support necessary to mount an 
adequate  defense.”308   
 
It   is   this  commentator’s   contention   that we never would have 
tolerated the continuing violation of the constitutional rights of those 
on trial for their life, were those on trial not poor and African-
American. On some level, it simply matters not, as the Report 
concludes,   that  “the   results  of  poor lawyering are often literally fatal 
for  capital  defendants.”309 
 
 Opposition to the implementation of the death penalty due to 
concerns about the quality of lawyering and the disproportionate 
impact on minorities came not only from the organized bar, but from 
on high – all the way to the Supreme Court. Justice Blackmun had 
been in the majority when the Court declared in Gregg that the death 
penalty statute was constitutional, 310 but eighteen years later, when 
dissenting   from   the  Court’s   refusal   to   grant   review   in   a  Texas   death  
penalty case, he wrote:  
  
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the 
machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have 
endeavored – indeed, I have struggled – along with a 
majority of this Court, to develop procedural and 
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere 
appearance of fairness to the death penalty 
endeavor….Rather   than  continue   to  coddle   the  Court’s  
delusion that the desired level of fairness has been 
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel 
morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede 
that the death penalty experiment has failed.311 
 
For twenty years Justice Blackmun sat on the Court reviewing cases 
where individuals had been sentenced to die. It is hard to dispute that 
                                                 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
311 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1141, 1130 (1994). 
Klein    
220  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:2 
 
 
when he speaks on this matter, he knows what he is talking about.312  
He addressed the issue of race head on in Callins v. Collins: 
 
The   arbitrariness   inherent   in   the   sentencer’s   discretion 
to afford mercy is exacerbated by the problem of race. 
Even under the most sophisticated death penalty statute, 
race continues to play a major role in determining who 
shall live and who shall die. Perhaps it should not be 
surprising that the biases and prejudices that infect 
society generally would influence the determination of 
who is sentenced to death, even within the narrower 
pool of death-eligible defendants selected according to 
objective standards.313 
 
And Justice Blackmun was not alone. Justice Sandra  Day  O’Connor  
stated,  after  she  had  retired  from  20  years  of  service  on  the  Court,  “I  
have to acknowledge that serious questions are being raised about 
whether the death penalty is being fairly administered in this country. 
Perhaps  it’s  time  to  look  at  minimum standards for appointed counsel 
in death cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when 
they  are  used.”314   
 
And Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg highlighted to the Associated 
Press   the  horrid   fate   that  awaits   the  poorly  represented:  “People  who 
are well represented at trial do  not  get  the  death  penalty….  I have yet 
to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on 
eve-of-executions stay applications in which the defendant was well 
represented  at  trial.”315   
                                                 
312 Justice Blackmun had been on the United States Court of Appeal before he ever 
joined the Supreme Court and, as an appeals judge, he voted on numerous occasions 
to enforce the death penalty.  Id. at 1130, n. 1. 
313 Id. at 1135. 
314 John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases, 
JOHN T. FLOYD LAW FIRM BLOG (Dec. 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.johntfloyd.com/blog/ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in-capital-cases. 
315 Id. For a thorough exploration, see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1835 (1994) (exploring the impact of poverty on the imposition of the death 
penalty due to the quality of representation provided by court-appointed counsel).  
Stephen Bright is currently the President and Senior Counsel for the Southern Center 
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And Justice Powell, who wrote the decision of the court in 
McCleskey,   responded   to   a   biographer’s   question   of   him   after   he  
retired, that he would choose to change his vote in the 5-4 decision in 
that case.316 
  
D. Incompetent Counsel in Texas 
 
The level of incompetence that can occur can be mind-
boggling indeed. George McFarland was an African-American man on 
trial for his life in Houston, Texas. The Court reporter for the Houston 
Chronicle described the scene as such: 
 
Seated   beside   his   client…defense attorney John Benn 
spent much   of   Thursday   afternoon’s   trial   in   apparent  
deep sleep. 
 
His mouth kept falling open and his head lolled back on 
his shoulders, and then he awakened just long enough 
to catch himself and sit upright. Then it happened 
again. And again. And again. 
Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution 
witness was on the stand describing another aspect of 
the…arrest  of  George  McFarland  in  the  robbery-killing 
of grocer Kenneth Kwan.  When state District Judge 
Doug Shaver finally called a recess, Benn was asked if 
he truly had fallen asleep during a capital murder trial. 
 
“It’s  boring,”  the  72-year old long time Houston lawyer 
explained….Court observers said Benn seems to have 
slept his way through virtually the entire trial.317 
 
                                                                                                                   
for Human Rights; he has tirelessly dedicated his career to the struggle in the South 
to obtain effective, competent counsel for indigents in capital cases. Id. 
316 New York Times Op-Ed, Justice  Powell’s  New  Wisdom, NY TIMES (June 11, 
1994), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/opinion/justice-powell-s-
new-wisdom.html. See also JOHN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A 
BIOGRAPHY (2001). 
317 James Kimberly, New Testimony in Sleeping-Lawyer Case, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, Aug. 15, 2003. 
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McFarland was convicted and sentenced to death in spite of juror 
consternation at the sleeping defense lawyer.318  
 
One juror submitted the following affidavit after the trial: 
“Benn  slept  during  great  portions  of   the  witness  testimony.   It  was  so  
blatant and disgusting that it was the subject of conversation within the 
jury  panel  a  couple  of  times.”319  
 
The trial judge was reported to have stated to a Houston 
Chronicle   reporter   during   the   course   of   the   trial:      “The  Constitution  
says   that   everyone’s   entitled   to   an   attorney   of   their   choice.   But the 
Constitution  does  not  say  that  the  lawyer  has  to  be  awake.”320  
 
There was not that much trial to be awake for; the trial began 
on August 10, the guilty verdict was rendered on August 12, and 
McFarland was sentenced to death on August 14.321 
 
 One might expect, or at least hope, that there would be some 
remedy at the appellate level for the defendant who is sentenced to 
death and whose lawyer explains at the hearing on the motion for a 
new  trial  that,  “I’m  72  years  old.  I  customarily  take  a  short  nap  in  the 
afternoon.”322 But none was forthcoming. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas, sitting en banc, while   noting   that,   “we   do   not  
condone  Benn’s  behavior,”323 applied the two prongs of the Strickland 
test and upheld the conviction.324 
                                                 
318 McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 482 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc). 
319 Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer and a Ticket to Death Row, LA TIMES (July 
15, 2000), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/15/news/mn-53250. 
320 Bruce Shapiro, Law and Order: How Awful Does a Lawyer Have to Be?  
Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kwalsh/shapiro.htm (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
321 Id. 
322 McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 505, n. 19. 
323 Id. at 505. 
324 Id. at 507. The Court relied on the fact that there was a second counsel 
representing the defendant even though that counsel clearly functioned in a 
secondary role and had engaged in minimal preparation and had met with the 
defendant only one time prior to trial. Id. at 527 (Baird, J., dissenting). The Court 
looked favorably upon co-counsel’s  statement  at  the  new  trial  hearing  that  he  made  
the strategic decision not to awaken Benn because the jury might have sympathy for 
the defendant when they observed counsel sleeping. Id. 505, n.20. However, it was 
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 The McFarland death sentence is not, in some ways, unique.  
Texas leads the country in executions during the period from 1976-
2014, more than four times as many people were put to death than the 
runner-ups, Virginia and Oklahoma.325  
 
E. A Short-lived Innovation: The Racial Justice Act of North 
Carolina 
 
Even though more than 80% of the executions during that 
period have occurred in the South,326  one Southern state – North 
Carolina – had, for a while at least, gone its own way. In response, in 
part, to the statistics regarding the significance of race in the 
imposition of the death penalty as highlighted in McCleskey,327 social 
scientists from the University of North Carolina demonstrated that 
when the victim of a murder was White, the defendant was three and a 
half times more likely to receive a death sentence in North Carolina 
than when the victim was African-American.328 The Racial Justice Act 
became law in North Carolina in 2009: 
 
An act to prohibit seeking or imposing the death 
penalty on the basis of race: to establish a process by 
                                                                                                                   
clear  that  Sanford  Melamed,  Benn’s  co-counsel in the case, was to play a distinctly 
secondary role. When the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered 
McFarland’s  application  it  revealed  the  following:  “The  judge  warned  Mr.  Melamed  
that he was to follow  Mr.  Benn’s  lead;;  he  was  not  to  make  any  decisions  in the case 
without  first  seeking  the  approval  of  both  Mr.  Benn  and  applicant.”  Id. at 750. But 
McFarland  “wanted  nothing  to  do  with  Mr.  Melamed  and  refused  to  sign  the  
appointment  of  counsel  form.” Id. It  is  hard  to  comprehend  the  Appeals’  Court  
conclusion  that,  nevertheless,  Benn’s  sleeping  did  not  show  prejudice  because  of  the  
presence of Melamed during the trial. Id. at 754–55. 
325Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State and Region 
Since 1976, DIPC (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-
inmates-executed-1976.  McFarland, as of March 2015, is still on death row and has 
not been executed. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Offender Information 
Details, SID Number: 02901248, TDCJ Number: 00999046 available at 
http://offender.tdcj.state.tx.us/OffenderSearch/offenderDetail.action?sid=02901248. 
326 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 325. 
327 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286–87. 
328 Kellie Slappey, Racial Justice Act, NORTH CAROLINA HIST. PROJECT, available at 
http://www.northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/490/entry (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014). 
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which relevant evidence may be used to establish that 
race was significant factor in seeking or imposing the 
death penalty within the county, the prosecutorial 
district, the judicial division or the state to identify 
types of evidence that may be considered by the court 
when considering whether race was a basis for seeking 
or imposing the death penalty including statistical 
evidence and to authorize the defendant to raise this 
claim at the pretrial conference or in post-conviction 
proceedings to provide that the defendant has the 
burden of proving that race was a significant factor in 
seeking or imposing the death penalty.329 
 
If an inmate could demonstrate that his sentence was improperly 
influenced by racial factors, then the sentence of death would be 
commuted to Life Without Parole.330  
 
And that is precisely what occurred for the first time in April 
2012. A death sentence was modified after a judge determined that the 
defendant   had   “introduced   a   wealth   of   evidence   showing   the  
persistent, pervasive, and distorting role of race in jury selection 
throughout   North   Carolina.”331 Later that same year, three other 
sentences were similarly commuted after the judge found that there 
was   “powerful   evidence   of   race   consciousness and race-based 
decision-making.”332 
 
 But the Act was caught in a web of political infighting; a newly 
Republican-controlled legislature in 2011 passed a repeal of the Act 
                                                 
329 Racial Justice Act, ch. 15A, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213. 
330 Id. 
331 Order Granting Motion for Appropriate Relief at 3, State v. Robinson, No. 91 
CRS 23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012). See also Anne Blythe, Retired Justices 
and Judges Offer Support for Racial Justice Act Cases, NEWS & OBSERVER (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/01/15/3535952_retired-justices-and-
judges-offer.html?rh=1. 
332 Campbell Robertson, Judge in North Carolina Voids 3 Death Sentences, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/us/citing-race-north-
carolina-judge-voids-death-sentences.html?_r=0. 
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which the Democratic Governor vetoed.333 In 2012, the legislature 
passed a modification of the Act which was again vetoed, but this time 
the veto was overridden.334 The newly-revised Act required that any 
statistical showing of racial bias was to be limited to the locality in 
which the crime occurred, and that the race of the victim was not to be 
taken into account.335 But the complete demise of the Act came in 
June 2013 when the newly elected Republican Governor repealed the 
legislation.336 
 
VII. RECOURSE FOR HARMED DEFENDANTS 
 
A. General Immunity of Public Defenders  
 
At one point, it had been an open issue in this country as to 
whether or not individual public defenders would be liable under the 
Civil Rights Act for violating the constitutional rights of their clients, 
but the Supreme Court resolved the matter in Polk County v. 
Dodson.337 In that case, the Court determined that defenders do not act 
under color of state law, and that the obligations and responsibilities of 
defenders are the same that all private counsel owe to their 
clients.338The fact that the salaries of defenders are paid by the state 
                                                 
333 Id. The comments of one Republican State Senator illustrate the intensity of the 
debate:  “We  have  people  who  have  been  rightfully  convicted  of cold-blooded 
murder in the first degree . . . [the Racial Justice Act was] nothing but a back-door 
attempt  to  get  rid  of  the  death  penalty.”  Wade  Rawlins,  North Carolina Lawmakers 
Override Race-Bias Death-Row Veto, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2012, 9:03 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/03/death-penalty-north-
carolina_n_1644919.html?. 
334 Rawlins, supra note 333. Overriding the  Governors’  veto  required a vote of at 
least 60 percent of the members of the North Carolina House of Representatives. Id. 
335 Robertson, supra note 332. 
336 Matt Smith, ‘Racial  Justice  Act’  Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 
2013, 3:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-
penalty. 
337 454 U.S. 312 (1981). 
338 Id. at 318.  Three years after Polk County, the Court did carve out an exception to 
the immunity provided public defenders for those situations where it was alleged that 
the defender had been part of a conspiracy with other state officials to deprive the 
defendant of his constitutional rights. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). 
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does not constitute state action.339 Unfortunately, the concerns voiced 
below by the prescient dissenting judges in Polk County have, as we 
shall see, now materialized thirty years later: 
 
The  County’s   control  over   the   size  of   and   funding   for  
the  public  defender’s  office,  as  well  as  over  the  number  
of potential clients, effectively dictates the size of an 
individual   attorney’s   caseload   and   influences  
substantially the amount of time the attorney is able to 
devote  to  each  case.  The  public  defender’s  discretion in 
handling individual cases – and therefore [their] ability 
to provide effective assistance to [their] clients – is 
circumscribed to an extent not experienced by privately 
retained attorneys.340 
 
B. The Extraordinary Situation in Washington State  
 
In December 2013, a federal District Court determined that the 
public defense system in two Washington municipalities was so 
overloaded, short-staffed and inadequate that there were systematic 
violations of the Sixth Amendment.341 United States District Judge 
Robert Lasnik concluded in Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, that the 
cities had made  “deliberate  choices  regarding  the  funding,  contracting,  
and monitoring of the public defense system that directly and 
predictably   caused   the   deprivation”   of   the   constitutional   rights   of  
indigent defendants.342  
 
The Public Defenders had caseloads of over 1,000 per year,343 
resulting   in   a   “meet   and  plead”   system  where   “adversarial   testing  of  
                                                 
339 The  Court  determined  that  “it  is  the  Constitutional  obligation  of  the  State  to  
respect the  professional  independence  of  the  public  defenders  whom  it  engages.”    
Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321–22. 
340 Id. at 332 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
341 Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 
2013). 
342 Id. at 1124. 
343 Id. This number was in sharp contrast to the June 2012 action of the Supreme 
Court of Washington which established 400 unweighted misdemeanor cases a year 
as  the  “maximum  caseload  for  fully  supported  full-time defense attorneys for cases 
of  average  complexity  and  effort.”  Id. at 1125. 
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the   government’s   case  was   so   infrequent   that   it  was   virtually   a   non-
factor  in  the  functioning  of  the  Cities’  criminal  justice  system.”344   
 
Mincing no words, the Court   found   that   the   “indigent  
defendants had virtually no relationship with their assigned counsel 
and could not fairly be said to have been represented by them at 
all.”345 
 
The Wilbur Court found that the cities themselves were liable 
under Section 1983 of the United States Code – Civil Action for 
Deprivation of Rights.346 That statute reads: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such   officer’s   judicial   capacity,  
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief 
was unavailable.347 
 
The Constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance is, of 
course, unchallenged,348 and the Wilbur Court determined that the 
“perfunctory  representation”  which  the  cities provided was in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment.349 The Court concluded that the 
Constitutional   deprivations  were   the   “predictable result of deliberate 
choices”  engaged  in  by  city officials. The Court was not confident that 
                                                 
344 Id. at 1124. 
345 Id. (emphasis added). 
346 Id. at 1133. 
347 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
348 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345; and, Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. 
349 Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 
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the two cities would make the required changes, and therefore 
determined that it must exercise its equitable powers. 350 
 
 But what was to be the remedy? In a truly extraordinary move, 
the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest351 with the 
Wilbur Court, while, at the same time, indicating that they were taking 
no position on the merits of the lawsuit.352 The Statement of Interest 
maintained that if the Court found that the plaintiffs prevailed and 
remedies were to be warranted, then controls should be placed on the 
“workload”353 of the defenders, and, that such  a  remedy  is  “well-suited 
to   implementation   by   an   independent   monitor.”354 The Justice 
Department explained: 
 
In the experience of the United States, appointing a 
monitor can provide substantial assistance to courts and 
parties and can reduce unnecessary delays and litigation 
over disputes regarding compliance. This is especially 
true when institutional reform can be expected to take a 
number of years. A monitor provides the independence 
and expertise necessary to conduct the objective, 
credible analysis upon which a court can rely to 
determine whether its order is being implemented, and 
that gives the parties and the community confidence in 
the  reform  process.  A  monitor  will  also  save  the  Court’s  
time.355 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
350 Id. at 1133–34. 
351 Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 
989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. 322).  
352 Id. at 1. 
353 Id. at  2.  The  Statement  used  “workload”  as  inclusive  not  only  of  a  numeric  
caseload, but also taking into account the complexity of the cases, the experience 
level of the defender and the overall resources available. Id. 
354 Id. at 9. The Justice Department informed the Court that the Court did have 
authority to order injunctive relief as a remedy to any identified constitutional 
violations. Id. at 6. 
355 Id. at 7. 
Klein    
2014]   CIVIL RIGHTS IN CRISIS 229 
 
 
 
VIII. DEFENSE COUNSEL AS PART OF THE PROBLEM 
 
A. Implicit Bias 
 
But the concerns about the impact that race may have on the 
prosecutors, judges and juries in our criminal justice system extend to 
choices made by defense counsel as well. If we accept the fact that 
most Americans on some level have perceptions that African-
Americans are more prone to commit crime than Whites, and that 
African-Americans represent more of a threat to public safety, then 
there   is   no   reason   to   expect   that   defenders   themselves   don’t   share  
these beliefs. If not on a conscious level, then, perhaps implicitly. 
 
There has been increased focus in recent years on the concept 
of implicit bias – subtle, negative stereotypes that Whites, (and even 
African-Americans) have regarding African-Americans.356 By its very 
definition, one is not aware of possessing such attitudes, but it is 
difficult to claim that frequent media portrayals of African-Americans 
– especially young African-American men – as criminal, violent, drug 
users and sellers, do not impact us all. Societal norms increasingly 
condemn the open expression of racism, and certainly most lawyers 
strive to avoid being perceived as racist.  
 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was developed in 1998 to 
explore  “the  unconscious  roots  of  thinking  and  feeling.”357 The test is 
available in 25 languages and has been completed by over 14 million 
people.358 A thorough analysis of the research undertaken to validate 
                                                 
356 Professor Charles Lawrence does not choose to be subtle in identifying this 
phenomenon. See, Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections 
on  the  Impact  and  Origins  of  “The  Id,  The  Ego,  and  Equal  Protection,” 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 931, 936 (2008). 
357 Origins and Measurement With the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/posttestinfo.html (last visited 
Sept.  21,  2014).  Project  Implicit  was  formed  by  the  designers  of  the  IAT  in  order  “to  
educate  the  public  about  implicit,  social  cognition.”  About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2014). In 
addition  to  race,  the  tests  can  reveal  attitudes  regarding  individuals’  gender,  weight,  
age, sexuality or religion. The IAT, BLINDSPOT, http://spottheblindspot.com/the-iat/ 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2014). 
358 See PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 357.  
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the IAT is beyond the scope of this Article, but the test is typically 
taken on a computer whereby individuals engage in quick associations 
of positive or negative attributes with photos that are displayed of 
African-Americans and Whites.359 
 
The IAT has consistently revealed that White Americans have 
strongly linked the pairing of admirable traits with Whites, and the 
association of negative characteristics with African-Americans.360  
Surprisingly, it has also been found by some researchers that African-
Americans   as   well   have   a   “[W]hite   preference,”   although   there   are  
wide variations amongst African-American test takers.361  The test 
designers explain this implicit, or  “automatic,” accordingly: 
 
Automatic White preference may be common among 
Americans because of the deep learning of negative 
associations to the group Black in this society. High 
levels of negative references to Black Americans in 
American culture and mass media may contribute to 
this learning. Such negative references may themselves 
be more the residue of the long history of racial 
discrimination in the United States than the result of 
deliberate efforts to discriminate in media treatments.362 
 
B. Implicit Bias in the Criminal Justice System 
 
It surely has been the contention of many observers of our 
criminal justice system that there may be implicit if not explicit racism 
at play when police use their discretion in determining who to arrest; 
                                                 
359 The designers of the test explain that photos are used instead of names in order to 
avoid any ambiguity. Frequently Asked Questions, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq17 (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2014). 
360 See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs 
from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES., AND PRAC. 
101, 105 (2002), available at 
http://advance.rackham.umich.edu/stride/Nosek_HarvestingImplicit.pdf. 
361 Id. at 105, n.7. Some recent research has concluded that approximately half of 
African-Americans show an automatic White preference, and that half demonstrate 
an African-American preference. PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 357. 
362 Id. 
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when prosecutors’   choose   who   to   prosecute   as   well as what level 
crime to charge, and, when judges decide what sentence is appropriate. 
But it may well be an unfortunate reality that implicit bias affects 
defense counsel’s choices as well. The overburdened defense attorney 
must, of necessity, decide which cases will be prioritized to receive 
one’s  time  and  effort,  and  which  cases  should  be  quickly  dealt  with  by  
a guilty plea. As with police, prosecutors, and judges, defense 
counsel’s  discretion   is  also   likely influenced by stereotypes of young 
African-American men. 
 
To be sure, the individual who chooses to become a public 
defender often does so with the personal conviction that the criminal 
justice system can be unfair and they want to put their energies into 
ameliorating the harm done, and, perhaps, even into reforming the 
process. The defender is likely to know all too well how minorities are 
treated unjustly – but that does not mean that implicit bias is not 
present, as is, occasionally, explicit bias. Counsel is obligated to focus 
on obtaining the best result possible for each client, and that might 
mean exploiting the bias of the prosecutor or judge. A personal 
anecdote may serve to illustrate this final point: 
 
As a staff attorney with the Criminal Defense Division of the 
Legal Aid Society for ten years, the vast majority of my clients were 
African-American or Hispanic. On one occasion, I picked up a case of 
a 21 year-old White college student who had previously pled guilty to 
Petit Larceny, an “A” Misdemeanor in New York for which the 
maximum sentence was a one-year period of incarceration. The 
defendant had entered the plea before a different judge a month earlier, 
and the pre-sentence report of the Probation Department recommended 
the imposition of the  maximum  sentence  due  to  the  defendant’s  prior  
history of similar thefts. When the court clerk first called the case, and 
the newly assigned judge read the pre-sentence report, the judge 
proceeded to mark the case for a Second Call and asked me to go with 
him to his chambers behind the courtroom. The judge, who was 
Jewish, like myself, proceeded to say to  me   that,   “this   defendant   is 
Jewish, we can’t  let  him  get  sent  to  Rikers Island [the jail in New York 
City]. I’ll adjourn the case and you should find him an alternative-to-
incarceration program  I  can  have  him  attend  instead.” 
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I often relate that incident to the students in my Criminal Law 
classes and inquire how I should have reacted. The  judge  didn’t  want 
my client to be  incarcerated  with  “similarly  situated”  minorities.  There 
was nothing implicit about the bias at play.  
 
And when prosecutors offer better deals to Whites than to 
minorities, who knows if it is implicit or explicit bias. From my own 
experience, counsel’s  argument that the defendant is a  “good  kid”  who  
just got in with the wrong crowd is much more likely to be accepted 
by the prosecutor and the judge when the defendant is White. And the 
minority male is far more commonly perceived to be the  “bad  apple”  
who needs to be taken off the streets and incarcerated.  
 
Take the case of Brian Banks who was exonerated in 2012 in 
Los Angeles after serving five years in prison for rape.363 Banks was 
16 when a 15-year old classmate accused him of the crime; there was 
no corroboration, physical or otherwise, to show that there was a 
rape.364 Banks, an African-American, was a star football player who 
had a verbal commitment to play on the USC football team with a full 
scholarship upon graduation from high school.365  
 
He was facing a sentence of 41 years to life if convicted, but 
there was a plea offer of five years.366 His counsel, to whom he had 
repeatedly insisted that  he  was  innocent,  reportedly  told  him,  “[y]ou’re  
a   big   black   teenager   and   they’re   automatically going to assume you 
are  guilty  and  you’ll  be  facing  41  years  to  life…this is the offer – good 
for  now  and  not  later.”367   
                                                 
363 Blindsided: The Exoneration of Brian Banks, CBS NEWS (Mar. 24, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/blindsided-the-exoneration-of-brian-banks/. 
364 Ashley Powers, A 10-Year Nightmare Over Rape Conviction is Over, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (May 25, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/may/25/local/la-me-rape-dismiss-20120525. 
Banks  claimed  that  the  two  had  engaged  in  consensual  “fooling  around,”  but  that  
there was no intercourse. There was no male  DNA  found  on  the  girl’s  underwear.    
Id. 
365 Blindsided: The Exoneration of Brian Banks, supra note 363. 
366 Maurice Possley, Brian Banks, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (June 2012), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3901. 
367 Robert Littal, H.  Elizabeth  Harris  The  Attorney  Who  Recommended  Brian  Banks’  
Plea Deal is a Judge Now, BLACK SPORTS ONLINE (May 31, 2012), 
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And the pressure was on; the defendant wished to discuss his 
options with his mother, but was not afforded   the   opportunity.   “It’s 
your   decision,   not   your   mom’s,”   defense   counsel   informed him.368  
Years later, the defendant unsuccessfully filed a state writ of habeas 
corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.369 Ten years after the 
initial accusation had been made, the accuser was secretly taped 
admitting she had fabricated the rape.370 The District Attorney 
responded by informing the court that a motion to exonerate Banks 
should be granted:  “We believe the recantations of the witness, we do 
not believe Mr. Banks did the crime he pled  guilty  to.”371 
 
So, the question is, in this scenario and many like it, did 
defense counsel just assume the  defendant’s guilt in spite of the lack of 
evidence – was this just one more “big black guy” accused of a violent 
act? Or, was counsel realistically assessing the stereotyping that a jury 
and judge were likely to engage in and therefore assume there would 
be a guilty verdict? Certainly the judge who had set a bail of one 
million dollars on Banks would hardly have been expected to be in any 
manner sympathetic to the defense at trial.372 Either way, for Banks 
the result was the same; his race seems to have been a prime factor in 
his serving five years in prison for a crime he did not commit.373  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Civil rights are in crisis in this country. There is no right that is 
more basic, more crucial, more fundamental than the right of liberty.  
The rights to sit at a lunch counter, to ride in the front of the bus, to be 
educated in a quality school that is equal and not separate, mean 
nothing   if  one’s   freedom   is   taken  away.  Yet   the  unwarranted   loss  of  
                                                                                                                   
http://blacksportsonline.com/home/2012/05/h-elizabeth-harris-the-attorney-who-
recommended-brian-banks-plea-deal-is-a-judge-now/. 
368 Id. 
369 Possley, supra note 366. The petition for the writ also contended that since there 
was no evidence that the rape had in fact occurred, the plea should be vacated. Id. 
370 Powers, supra note 364. 
371 Id.  
372 Blindsided: The Exoneration of Brian Banks, supra note 363. 
373 Banks’  lawyer  paid  no  price  whatsoever  for  her  role in the matter. Id. In fact, 
Banks counsel, H. Elizabeth Harris, was elected in 2012 as a Los Angeles Superior 
Court  Commissioner  by  the  court’s  judges.    Littal,  supra note 367.  
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liberty is precisely what occurs all too often in this country to our 
minorities, and it occurs all too often because the constitutional right 
to the effective assistance of counsel is violated. Without effective 
counsel,  there  is  no  one  to  “police  the  police,”  no  one  to  challenge  an  
unconstitutional search which may violate the Fourth Amendment, or 
a confession which has been coerced in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, or a lineup which was unduly suggestive and violates the 
due process which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, or a 
sentence which is grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation 
of   the   Eighth   Amendment’s   prohibition   against   cruel   and unusual 
punishment.   
 
 The year 1963 was graced with two monumental events:  
Martin   Luther   King   delivered   his   “I   Have   a   Dream   Speech”   at   the  
historic March on Washington for civil rights, and the Supreme Court 
decided Gideon v. Wainwright, requiring states to provide counsel to 
indigent defendants.374 Yet, over 50 years later, both are dreams 
unfulfilled. The Department of Justice has estimated that one in three 
African-American men will go to prison at some time during their 
lives,375 and are six times more likely to be incarcerated than are white 
males.376 In two of our largest cities – Chicago and Los Angeles – over 
80% of prisoners are minorities,377 and   in   the   nation’s   capital   of  
Washington, D.C., 91% of the inmates in 2014 were African-
American.378  And, as this article has repeatedly pointed out, all too 
often those inmates have been represented by counsel who have been 
besieged by caseloads which have precluded them from providing the 
constitutionally-mandated effective assistance.379   
 
 Our understanding of civil rights has certainly expanded in 
recent years.  Whereas to be sure, the concept is most closely linked 
with the struggles of African-Americans in the 1950s which related to 
schools, housing, public accommodations, and voting, the phrase now 
                                                 
374 See supra note 39. 
375 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2011, 8 tbl. 8 (Dec. 2012).  
376 The Sentencing Project, Report of the Sentencing Project to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States 
Criminal Justice System (August, 2013) at 1.  
377 See supra notes 22 and 24. 
378 See supra note 25.  
379 See, e.g., supra note 206. 
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includes issues relating to discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, 
and sexual orientation.   
 
As the plight of minorities in our criminal justice system 
becomes a focus as it never has before,380 we must realize that the 
deprivation of liberty due to ineffective counsel may well indeed be 
the civil rights issue of our day. Historically and inexplicably, the right 
to  counsel  has  not  been  dealt  with  as  a  “civil  rights”  issue.    But  it  most  
surely   is.   Black’s   Law   Dictionary   defines   civil   rights   as follows:  
“These   are   the   rights   that   are   granted   to   every   citizen   of   the  United  
States  by   the  Constitution  and  all  of   its  amendments.”381 What could 
be clearer? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy similarly states 
that civil rights are the basic legal rights a person must possess in 
order  to  have  equal  citizenship;;  they  are  “the  rights  that  constitute  free  
and equal citizenship and include personal, political and economic 
rights.”382 What  is  possibly  more  “personal”  than  liberty?  John  Rawls,  
considered by many to be the most important political philosopher of 
the 20th Century, has emphasized that all citizens of a liberal 
democracy   are   entitled   to   a   “fully   adequate   scheme of equal basic 
liberties.”383 
 
 Why  would   the   labelling   of   the  Right   to  Counsel   as   a   “Civil 
Right,”  be  of  such  import?  Perhaps  it  will  make  all  of  us  simply  care  
                                                 
380    In recent years, there have been a number of highly publicized incidents of 
White police officers shooting African-American men. The most recent incident was 
caught on camera and shows a police officer in South Carolina shooting Walter 
Scott, an African-American man,  in  the  back.  Walter  Scott’s  murder  occurred  at  a  
tense time for Americans because of the images of Eric Garner being choked to 
death by a police officer in Staten Island, NY; the murder of unarmed teenager 
Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman; and the shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri. Every one of those incidents was met with protests throughout 
the country with demands for police reform, acknowledgement of systematic 
problem in the criminal justice system, and accountability for the deaths of these 
unarmed African-American men.  
381  Black’s  Law  Dictionary,  Standard  Ninth  Edition  (2009).    Barron’s  Law  
Dictionary  defines  Civil  Right  as  “Rights  given,  defined,  and  circumscribed  by  laws  
enacted by civilized communities . . . . Also, defined as rights of a citizen or citizens, 
and laws relating to the private rights of individuals and to legal actions involving 
these.”  Steven  H.  Gifis,  Barron’s  Law  Dictionary  (2010). 
382  Id. 
383  JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42 (2001). 
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more. Politicians have, to this date, not rallied round the flag in 
support of rights for indigent defendants. There is no constituency that 
politicians believe must be won over; no constituency, that is, except 
the Sixth Amendment. Legislatures, as we have seen in this article, 
simply  don’t   fund  public  defenders   as   the  Constitution   requires.  The  
Supreme Court sets a standard for assessing the constitutionally-
mandated effective assistance so low as to permit incompetent counsel 
to represent our powerless, and too often voiceless, urban poor. 
 
 It is a matter of ongoing debate amongst some legal academics 
whether our Court has, historically, led the way toward civil rights 
enforcement, or whether the Court merely responds to changing 
community sentiment.384 One thing is for sure: our Court has indeed 
reversed   its   prior   decisions   due   to   freshly   perceived   “evolving  
standards   of   decency.”      The  Court   in  Atkins v. Virginia,385 in 2002, 
reversed its holding of thirteen years earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh,386 
and concluded that a new consensus had evolved which opposed 
execution of the mentally retarded.387 Similarly, the Court in 2005, in 
the case of Roper v. Simmons,388 concluded that it was in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty on an individual 
who was less than 18 years old at the time the crime was committed; 
the  decision  directly  overturned  the  Court’s  holding  in  1989  which  had  
permitted such executions.389 And Gideon itself entailed the reversal 
of  the  Court’s  prior  holding  in  Betts v. Brady.390 
  
The time has come for the Court to reconsider and revise its 
holding in Strickland; the time has come for the Court to acknowledge 
that   indigents’   civil   rights   are   being   violated   by   lower courts’ 
interpretations  of  the  Court’s  decision.    The  time  has  also  come  for  the  
highest state courts to find that their state constitutional guarantees of 
effective assistance are inadequate because of recurrent civil rights 
violations. The time has come for state legislatures as well as Congress 
                                                 
384  See e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 
YALE L. J. 8, 2574, 2700 (2014).  
385   536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
386   492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
387   Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
388   534 U.S. 551 (2005). 
389   Id. at 572–573. 
390   316 U.S. 455, 468 (1942). See supra notes 37 – 41, and related text. 
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to enact sufficient funds for indigent defense. The time has come for 
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which was 
created   by   the   Civil   Rights   Act   of   1957   to   “uphold   the   civil   and  
constitutional   rights   of   all   Americans,”391 to actively enforce Sixth 
Amendment   guarantees.   The   Division   boasts   that   it   “has   grown  
dramatically in both size and scope, and has played a role in many of 
the  nation’s  pivotal  civil  rights  battles.”392 Well, the time has come to 
play a leadership role in this pivotal battle to enforce the civil right of 
the indigent accused of crime to effective assistance of counsel.   
 
But it is not just government attorneys who must take the lead.  
The legal profession, at every level, must join in attempting to mitigate 
the crisis. And lawyers are obligated to do just that. The Preamble to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct begins by instructing that a 
lawyer  is  a  “public  citizen  having  special  responsibility  for  the  quality 
of justice.”393 And,   the   Preamble   continues,   “a   lawyer   should   seek  
improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration 
of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession.”394 Closing our eyes to injustice, and accepting a tomorrow 
which is a repeat of yesterday for indigent minority defendants, is 
intolerable. 
 
 We all must realize our own personal interest in this battle.  
When vigorous advocacy by defense counsel informs police officers 
that they will not be able to get away with an unconstitutional search, 
we all benefit.  Zealous advocacy is required for us to keep the police 
honest, or as honest as we can keep them; otherwise, there may be 
nothing to deter the police from entering any one of our homes with 
little or no probable   cause.   But   we   shouldn’t   have   to   call   on   self-
interest; we have a glorious history in this country of rallying on 
                                                 
391   United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, About the Division, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about.  
392  Id. Three of the most significant of the eleven sections of the Division are the 
Criminal, Special Litigation, and the Policy and Strategy Sections. 
393   American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct:  Preamble 
and Scope – A  Lawyer’s  Responsibilities,  Section  1  (emphasis  added), available at       
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_sc
ope.html. 
394   Id. at Section 6.  
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behalf of those whose civil rights are being systematically violated.  
Informed   Americans   wouldn’t   choose   to   tolerate   a   criminal   justice  
system where poor people are provided representation that we would 
never regard as acceptable for any member of our own family. And we 
would certainly not want the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to 
conclude as it recently did, that if counsel fell asleep during the cross-
examination of the defendant who was on trial, that the conviction 
should   stand   because   counsel   hadn’t   actually   slept   during   a  
“substantial  portion”  of  the  trial.395  
 
 Approximately  60%  of  the  inmates  in  our  country’s  prisons  are  
minorities.396 A research study conducted by the Sentencing Project in 
2014   concluded   that   “disparities   in   police   stops,   in   prosecutorial  
charging, and in bail and sentencing decisions reveal that implicit 
racial bias has penetrated all corners of the criminal justice system.”397  
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the Department of 
Justice, African-American men aged 18 and 19 were imprisoned at 9 
times the rate of White men.398 
 
 Indigents pay an enormous price for incompetent, overloaded 
lawyers at the bail hearing which is so crucial to the ultimate outcome 
of the litigation. The defendant who is not incarcerated as the case 
progresses through the court is in a better bargaining posture during 
plea negotiations, is able to locate witnesses, assist counsel in the 
preparation of the case for hearings or trial, and has the capability to 
enter a drug rehabilitation program. Counselors from such treatment 
centers can present reports to the court and to prosecutors outlining the 
progress that the defendant has made in dealing with whatever 
                                                 
395  Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011).  Muniz was convicted of assault 
with intent to commit murder; it was claimed that while counsel had slept, the 
testifying defendant made statements that led to the admission of evidence against 
him and that the prosecutor posed questions which, had counsel been awake and 
objected, would not have been permitted. Id. at 625. 
396  Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Prisoners in 2013, Revised September 30, 2014.   
397   The Sentencing Project, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and 
Support for Punitive Policies, 2014.  
398    Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice, 
Prisoners in 2011, 2012 at 8.  
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problem might have led to the commission of the act for which he is 
being prosecuted. And the problem for many indigents is far more 
severe than just having inadequate counsel. A 2015 Report of the 
Constitution Project found that in eight states, the indigent has no 
lawyer present at all for the bail hearing, and in seventeen other states, 
counsel appear only infrequently.399 
 
 Since  most   of   those   prosecuted   in   our   states’   criminal   courts  
are not only minority, but also poor,400 approximately 82% of those 
who are prosecuted for felonies have had court-appointed counsel.401 
If  we  are  to  have  the  “Equal  Justice  Under  the  Law”  which  is  engraved  
on the front of the Supreme Court building, if we are to have the 
“Liberty  and  Justice  for  All”  that  is  recited  by  school  children  as  part  
of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, then the denial of the right to 
effective counsel for indigent, minority Americans must, I maintain, 
be reframed as a Civil Rights issue. And as such, this struggle for 
liberty, equality, and justice must be waged with new determination, 
energy,   and   resources   in   order   to   “right”   the   “wrongs”   to which we 
have closed our eyes for far too long. 
 
                                                 
399    NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DON’T I 
NEED A LAWYER? PRETRIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT FIRST 
JUDICIAL BAIL HEARING, 124 (March 2015). See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
CORRECTIONS, MONEY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER:  THE JUDGE’S 
DECISION TO RELEASE OR DETAIN A DEFENDANT PRETRIAL (2014).  
400    See CAROLIN WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000). 
401    See National Institute of Justice, Indigent Defense: International Perspectives 
and Research Needs, note 3 (2011).  In the large state courts, 68.3 percent of 
defendants were represented by public defenders, and 13.7 percent had court-
appointed assigned counsel.  In the Federal Courts, 30.1 per cent of defendants were 
represented by a public defender, and 36.3 per cent had court-appointed counsel 
from the Criminal Justice Act panel of attorneys.  These numbers date back to 1998, 
the last year such statistics were available.  See also Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Special Report, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Defense 
Counsel in Criminal Cases (2000) at 1.   
